4.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: David Lebrun <[email protected]> [ Upstream commit 2f3bb64247b5b083d05ccecad9c2e139bbfdc294 ] This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in seg6_validate_srh() when the trailing data is less than sizeof(struct sr6_tlv). Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- net/ipv6/seg6.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) --- a/net/ipv6/seg6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6.c @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ bool seg6_validate_srh(struct ipv6_sr_hd struct sr6_tlv *tlv; unsigned int tlv_len; + if (trailing < sizeof(*tlv)) + return false; + tlv = (struct sr6_tlv *)((unsigned char *)srh + tlv_offset); tlv_len = sizeof(*tlv) + tlv->len;
