4.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Daniel Micay <danielmi...@gmail.com> commit 5ea30e4e58040cfd6434c2f33dc3ea76e2c15b05 upstream. The stack canary is an 'unsigned long' and should be fully initialized to random data rather than only 32 bits of random data. Signed-off-by: Daniel Micay <danielmi...@gmail.com> Acked-by: Arjan van de Ven <ar...@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <r...@redhat.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> Cc: Arjan van Ven <ar...@linux.intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <pet...@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de> Cc: kernel-harden...@lists.openwall.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170504133209.3053-1-danielmi...@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> --- kernel/fork.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_stru set_task_stack_end_magic(tsk); #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR - tsk->stack_canary = get_random_int(); + tsk->stack_canary = get_random_long(); #endif /*
