On Mon, 22 May 2017 19:10:25 -0400 Daniel Micay <danielmi...@gmail.com> wrote:
> This adds support for compiling with a rough equivalent to the glibc > _FORTIFY_SOURCE=1 feature, providing compile-time and runtime buffer > overflow checks for string.h functions when the compiler determines the > size of the source or destination buffer at compile-time. Unlike glibc, > it covers buffer reads in addition to writes. > > GNU C __builtin_*_chk intrinsics are avoided because they would force a > much more complex implementation. They aren't designed to detect read > overflows and offer no real benefit when using an implementation based > on inline checks. Inline checks don't add up to much code size and allow > full use of the regular string intrinsics while avoiding the need for a > bunch of _chk functions and per-arch assembly to avoid wrapper overhead. > > This detects various overflows at compile-time in various drivers and > some non-x86 core kernel code. There will likely be issues caught in > regular use at runtime too. > > Future improvements left out of initial implementation for simplicity, > as it's all quite optional and can be done incrementally: > > * Some of the fortified string functions (strncpy, strcat), don't yet > place a limit on reads from the source based on __builtin_object_size of > the source buffer. > > * Extending coverage to more string functions like strlcat. > > * It should be possible to optionally use __builtin_object_size(x, 1) for > some functions (C strings) to detect intra-object overflows (like > glibc's _FORTIFY_SOURCE=2), but for now this takes the conservative > approach to avoid likely compatibility issues. > > * The compile-time checks should be made available via a separate config > option which can be enabled by default (or always enabled) once enough > time has passed to get the issues it catches fixed. Confused by the final paragraph. The patch adds CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE so isn't that to-do item completed? Also, what does __NO_FORTIFY do? Nothing ever defines it?
