On Sat, 27 May 2017, Kees Cook wrote: > On Sat, May 27, 2017 at 1:41 AM, Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Fri, May 26, 2017 at 01:17:09PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > >> The LSM initialization routines walk security_hook_heads as an array > >> of struct list_head instead of via names to avoid a ton of needless > >> source. Whitelist this to avoid the false positive warning from the > >> plugin: > > > > I think this crap just needs to be fixed properly. If not it almost > > defeats the protections as the "security" ops are just about everywhere. > > There's nothing unsafe about 3dfc9b02864b19f4dab376f14479ee4ad1de6c9e, > it just avoids tons of needless code.
Removing needless code is a security feature, ideally. > Tetsuo has some other ideas for > cleaning it up further, but I don't like it because it removes > compile-time verification of function types. There have been a lot of > trade-offs in getting this working correctly, so I don't have any > problem with how it looks currently. It's just a collision of > assumptions between randstruct (omg, you're accessing a randomized > struct with a different struct!) and the security head list (all > entries are lists, and we're just initializing them). Fix randstruct perhaps, rather than modifying kernel code to shut it up. -- James Morris <[email protected]>
