"Serge E. Hallyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Quoting Miklos Szeredi ([EMAIL PROTECTED]): >> From: Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> >> If CLONE_NEWNS and CLONE_NEWNS_USERMNT are given to clone(2) or >> unshare(2), then allow user mounts within the new namespace. >> >> This is not flexible enough, because user mounts can't be enabled for >> the initial namespace. >> >> The remaining clone bits also getting dangerously few... >> >> Alternatives are: >> >> - prctl() flag >> - setting through the containers filesystem > > Sorry, I know I had mentioned it, but this is definately my least > favorite approach. > > Curious whether are any other suggestions/opinions from the containers > list?
Given the existence of shared subtrees allowing/denying this at the mount namespace level is silly and wrong. If we need more than just the filesystem permission checks can we make it a mount flag settable with mount and remount that allows non-privileged users the ability to create mount points under it in directories they have full read/write access to. I don't like the use of clone flags for this purpose but in this case the shared subtress are a much more fundamental reasons for not doing this at the namespace level. Eric - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
