From: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]> This allows locking down user namespaces tighter, and it could even be considered a security fix.
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <[email protected]> --- kernel/user_namespace.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 246d4d4ce5c7..2354f7ade78a 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c @@ -50,11 +50,12 @@ static void set_cred_user_ns(struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *user_ns) * anything as the capabilities are bound to the new user namespace. */ cred->securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; + cred->cap_bset = task_no_new_privs(current) ? current_cred()->cap_bset + : CAP_FULL_SET; cred->cap_inheritable = CAP_EMPTY_SET; - cred->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET; - cred->cap_effective = CAP_FULL_SET; + cred->cap_permitted = cred->cap_bset; + cred->cap_effective = cred->cap_bset; cred->cap_ambient = CAP_EMPTY_SET; - cred->cap_bset = CAP_FULL_SET; #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS key_put(cred->request_key_auth); cred->request_key_auth = NULL; -- 2.15.1.620.gb9897f4670-goog
