On 01/30/2018 03:46 PM, Christophe de Dinechin wrote:
>
>
>> On 30 Jan 2018, at 13:11, Christian Borntraeger <borntrae...@de.ibm.com>
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 01/30/2018 01:23 AM, Linus Torvalds wrote:
>> [...]
>>>
>>> So I actually have a _different_ question to the virtualization
>>> people. This includes the vmware people, but it also obviously
>>> incldues the Amazon AWS kind of usage.
>>>
>>> When you're a hypervisor (whether vmware or Amazon), why do you even
>>> end up caring about these things so much? You're protected from
>>> meltdown thanks to the virtual environment already having separate
>>> page tables. And the "big hammer" approach to spectre would seem to
>>> be to just make sure the BTB and RSB are flushed at vmexit time - and
>>> even then you might decide that you really want to just move it to
>>> vmenter time, and only do it if the VM has changed since last time
>>> (per CPU).
>>>
>>> Why do you even _care_ about the guest, and how it acts wrt Skylake?
>>> What you should care about is not so much the guests (which do their
>>> own thing) but protect guests from each other, no?
>>>
>>> So I'm a bit mystified by some of this discussion within the context
>>> of virtual machines. I think that is separate from any measures that
>>> the guest machine may then decide to partake in.
>>>
>>> If you are ever going to migrate to Skylake, I think you should just
>>> always tell the guests that you're running on Skylake. That way the
>>> guests will always assume the worst case situation wrt Specte.
>>>
>>> Maybe that mystification comes from me missing something.
>>
>> I can only speak for KVM, but I think the hypervisor issues come from
>> the fact that for migration purposes the hypervisor "lies" to the guest
>> in regard to what kind of CPU is running. (it has to lie, see below).
>>
>> This is to avoid random guest crashes by not announcing features. For
>> example if you want to migrate forth and back between a system that
>> has AVX512 and another one that has not you must tell the guest that
>> AVX512 is not available - even if it runs on the capable system.
>>
>> To protect against new features the hypervisor only announces features
>> that it understands.
>> So you essentially start a VM in QEMU of a given CPU type that is
>> constructed of a base cpu type plus extra features. Before migration,
>> it is checked if he target system can run a guest of given type -
>> otherwise migration is rejected.
>>
>> The management stack also knows things like baselining - basically
>> creating the best possible guest CPU given a set of hosts.
>>
>> The problem now is: If you have lets say Broadwell and Skylakes.
>> What kind of CPU type are you telling your guest? If you claim
>> broadwell but run on skylake then you prevent that the guest can
>> protect itself, because the guest does not know that it should do
>> something special. If you say skylake the guest might start using
>> features that broadwell does not understand.
>
> I believe that Linus’ question was whether it makes sense to defer
> the entirety of the protection to the host kernel, although I was a bit
> confused by his suggestion to always assume Skylake.
>
> In other words, is it safe enough to rely on the host kernel countermeasure
> to protect guest kernels and their applications? In which case having
> the guest believe it runs on Broadwell would not be that problematic.
>
> Aren’t there enough vmexits on the guest kernel context switch
> to enforce protection on its behalf? Even if it’s
>
> a) some old kernel that without mitigation code
>
> or
>
> b) some new kernel that thinks it runs on an old CPU and disabled mitigation
>
I think it is not safe to just protect the host. CPU bound workload in the guest
will switch a lot between guest user and guest kernel without triggering an
exit.
