4.9-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk>

(cherry picked from commit 20ffa1caecca4db8f79fe665acdeaa5af815a24d)

Expose indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() for use in subsequent patches.

[ tglx: Add IBPB status to spectre_v2 sysfs file ]

Co-developed-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karah...@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karah...@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: gno...@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk
Cc: a...@linux.intel.com
Cc: ashok....@intel.com
Cc: dave.han...@intel.com
Cc: ar...@linux.intel.com
Cc: torva...@linux-foundation.org
Cc: pet...@infradead.org
Cc: b...@alien8.de
Cc: pbonz...@redhat.com
Cc: tim.c.c...@linux.intel.com
Cc: gre...@linux-foundation.org
Link: 
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516896855-7642-8-git-send-email-d...@amazon.co.uk
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   |    2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |   13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |   10 +++++++++-
 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -202,6 +202,8 @@
 /* Because the ALTERNATIVE scheme is for members of the X86_FEATURE club... */
 #define X86_FEATURE_KAISER     ( 7*32+31) /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION w/o 
nokaiser */
 
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB               ( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch 
Prediction Barrier enabled*/
+
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW  ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VNMI        ( 8*32+ 1) /* Intel Virtual NMI */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -218,5 +218,18 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
+{
+       asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("",
+                                "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t"
+                                "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t"
+                                "movl $0, %%edx\n\t"
+                                "wrmsr",
+                                X86_FEATURE_IBPB)
+                    : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD),
+                        [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+                    : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory");
+}
+
 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* __NOSPEC_BRANCH_H__ */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -262,6 +262,13 @@ retpoline_auto:
                setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
                pr_info("Filling RSB on context switch\n");
        }
+
+       /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier if supported */
+       if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+           boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD)) {
+               setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+               pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n");
+       }
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
@@ -291,7 +298,8 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct devic
        if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
                return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
 
-       return sprintf(buf, "%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+       return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+                      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ? ", IPBP" : "",
                       spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : 
"");
 }
 #endif


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