On Saturday 26 May 2007 15:34, Alan Cox wrote:
> > As such, AA can detect whether you did exec("gzip") or exec("gunzip")
> > and apply the policy relevant to the program. It could apply different
>
> That's not actually useful for programs which link the same binary to
> multiple names because if you don't consider argv[0] as well I can run
> /usr/bin/gzip passing argv[0] of "gunzip" and get one set of policies and
> the other set of behaviour.I partially agree. Taken together with the policy of the calling process, things suddenly start to make more sense though (even if gzip/gunzip don't make good examples): if only allowed to execute /usr/bin/gzip, the calling process can still get the gunzip behavior, but it will be bound by the /usr/bin/gzip policy. Controlling the policy is what we really care about; this limits the allowed behavior. We cannot really control the behavior of an application anyway (think of bugs alone), but we can set the bounds for that behavior. > And then we have user added hardlinks of course. Yes, allowing confined processes to change what they are allowed to execute under a more permissive policy is not such a good idea. Thanks, Andreas - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
