--- Cliffe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> On the other hand, if you actually want to protect the _data_, then > tagging the _name_ is flawed; tag the *DATA* instead. > > Would it make sense to label the data (resource) with a list of paths > (names) that can be used to access it?
Program Access Lists (PALs) were* a feature of UNICOS. PALs could contain not only the list of programs that could use them, but what attributes the processes required as well. Further, you could restrict or raise privilege based on the uid, gid, MAC label, and privilege state of the process during exec based on the PAL. > Therefore the data would be protected against being accessed via > alternative arbitrary names. This may be a simple label to maintain and > (possibly to) enforce, allowing path based confinement to protect a > resource. This may allow for the benefits of pathname based confinement > while avoiding some of its problems. Yep, but you still have the label based system issues, the classic case being the text editor that uses "creat new", "unlink old", "rename new to old". When the labeling scheme is more sopisticated than "object gets label of subject" label management becomes a major issue. > Obviously this would not protect against a pathname pointing to > arbitrary data Protecting special data is easy. Protecting arbitrary data is the problem. > Just a thought. Not a bad one, and it would be an easy and fun LSM to create. If I were teaching a Linux kernel programming course I would consider it for a class project. ----- * I have used the past tense here in spite of the many instances of UNICOS still in operation. I don't believe that there is any current development on UNICOS. Casey Schaufler [EMAIL PROTECTED] - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
