4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Chenbo Feng <fe...@google.com>
commit 0fa4fe85f4724fff89b09741c437cbee9cf8b008 upstream.
The current check statement in BPF syscall will do a capability check
for CAP_SYS_ADMIN before checking sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This
code path will trigger unnecessary security hooks on capability checking
and cause false alarms on unprivileged process trying to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN
access. This can be resolved by simply switch the order of the statement
and CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not required anyway if unprivileged bpf syscall is
allowed.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fe...@google.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <lore...@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf
union bpf_attr attr = {};
int err;
- if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled)
+ if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uattr, 1))
