4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Chenbo Feng <[email protected]> commit 0fa4fe85f4724fff89b09741c437cbee9cf8b008 upstream. The current check statement in BPF syscall will do a capability check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN before checking sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled. This code path will trigger unnecessary security hooks on capability checking and cause false alarms on unprivileged process trying to get CAP_SYS_ADMIN access. This can be resolved by simply switch the order of the statement and CAP_SYS_ADMIN is not required anyway if unprivileged bpf syscall is allowed. Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <[email protected]> Acked-by: Lorenzo Colitti <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(bpf, int, cmd, union bpf union bpf_attr attr = {}; int err; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) && sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled) + if (sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uattr, 1))
