4.9-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Will Deacon <[email protected]> [ Upstream commit 88b0193d9418c00340e45e0a913a0813bc6c8c96 ] Perf can generate and record a user callchain in response to a synchronous request, such as a tracepoint firing. If this happens under set_fs(KERNEL_DS), then we can end up walking the user stack (and dereferencing/saving whatever we find there) without the protections usually afforded by checks such as access_ok. Rather than play whack-a-mole with each architecture's stack unwinding implementation, fix the root of the problem by ensuring that we force USER_DS when invoking perf_callchain_user from the perf core. Reported-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <[email protected]> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> Cc: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]> Cc: Jiri Olsa <[email protected]> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- kernel/events/callchain.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/kernel/events/callchain.c +++ b/kernel/events/callchain.c @@ -227,12 +227,18 @@ get_perf_callchain(struct pt_regs *regs, } if (regs) { + mm_segment_t fs; + if (crosstask) goto exit_put; if (add_mark) perf_callchain_store_context(&ctx, PERF_CONTEXT_USER); + + fs = get_fs(); + set_fs(USER_DS); perf_callchain_user(&ctx, regs); + set_fs(fs); } }
