On (04/20/18 10:02), Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 20, 2018 at 11:38:09AM +0900, Sergey Senozhatsky wrote:
> > On (04/05/18 21:26), Cyrill Gorcunov wrote:
> > [..]
> > > -
> > >  #ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
> > >   if (opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP || opt == PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE)
> > >           return prctl_set_mm_map(opt, (const void __user *)addr, arg4);
> > >  #endif
> > >  
> > > - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
> > > -         return -EPERM;
> > > -
> > > - if (opt == PR_SET_MM_EXE_FILE)
> > > -         return prctl_set_mm_exe_file(mm, (unsigned int)addr);
> > > -
> > > - if (opt == PR_SET_MM_AUXV)
> > > -         return prctl_set_auxv(mm, addr, arg4);
> > 
> > Then validate_prctl_map() and prctl_set_mm_exe_file() can be moved
> > under CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE ifdef.
> 
> I don't mind. Could you please make the patch on top of linux-next?

As far as I can see, it's not in linux-next yet. So the following is
against the mmots tree. I wouldn't mind it if we could just squash the
patches.

=======================================================================

From: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhat...@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] prctl: Don't compile some of prctl functions when CRUI
 disabled

CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is the only user of validate_prctl_map()
and prctl_set_mm_exe_file(), so we can move those two under
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE.

Signed-off-by: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhat...@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/sys.c | 126 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------
 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 6bdffe264303..86e5ef1a5612 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1815,68 +1815,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(umask, int, mask)
        return mask;
 }
 
-static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
-{
-       struct fd exe;
-       struct file *old_exe, *exe_file;
-       struct inode *inode;
-       int err;
-
-       exe = fdget(fd);
-       if (!exe.file)
-               return -EBADF;
-
-       inode = file_inode(exe.file);
-
-       /*
-        * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
-        * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
-        * overall picture.
-        */
-       err = -EACCES;
-       if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
-               goto exit;
-
-       err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
-       if (err)
-               goto exit;
-
-       /*
-        * Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped.
-        */
-       exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
-       err = -EBUSY;
-       if (exe_file) {
-               struct vm_area_struct *vma;
-
-               down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-               for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
-                       if (!vma->vm_file)
-                               continue;
-                       if (path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path,
-                                      &exe_file->f_path))
-                               goto exit_err;
-               }
-
-               up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-               fput(exe_file);
-       }
-
-       err = 0;
-       /* set the new file, lockless */
-       get_file(exe.file);
-       old_exe = xchg(&mm->exe_file, exe.file);
-       if (old_exe)
-               fput(old_exe);
-exit:
-       fdput(exe);
-       return err;
-exit_err:
-       up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
-       fput(exe_file);
-       goto exit;
-}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
 /*
  * WARNING: we don't require any capability here so be very careful
  * in what is allowed for modification from userspace.
@@ -1968,7 +1907,68 @@ static int validate_prctl_map(struct prctl_mm_map 
*prctl_map)
        return error;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
+static int prctl_set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned int fd)
+{
+       struct fd exe;
+       struct file *old_exe, *exe_file;
+       struct inode *inode;
+       int err;
+
+       exe = fdget(fd);
+       if (!exe.file)
+               return -EBADF;
+
+       inode = file_inode(exe.file);
+
+       /*
+        * Because the original mm->exe_file points to executable file, make
+        * sure that this one is executable as well, to avoid breaking an
+        * overall picture.
+        */
+       err = -EACCES;
+       if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || path_noexec(&exe.file->f_path))
+               goto exit;
+
+       err = inode_permission(inode, MAY_EXEC);
+       if (err)
+               goto exit;
+
+       /*
+        * Forbid mm->exe_file change if old file still mapped.
+        */
+       exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
+       err = -EBUSY;
+       if (exe_file) {
+               struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+               down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+               for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+                       if (!vma->vm_file)
+                               continue;
+                       if (path_equal(&vma->vm_file->f_path,
+                                      &exe_file->f_path))
+                               goto exit_err;
+               }
+
+               up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+               fput(exe_file);
+       }
+
+       err = 0;
+       /* set the new file, lockless */
+       get_file(exe.file);
+       old_exe = xchg(&mm->exe_file, exe.file);
+       if (old_exe)
+               fput(old_exe);
+exit:
+       fdput(exe);
+       return err;
+exit_err:
+       up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+       fput(exe_file);
+       goto exit;
+}
+
 static int prctl_set_mm_map(int opt, const void __user *addr, unsigned long 
data_size)
 {
        struct prctl_mm_map prctl_map = { .exe_fd = (u32)-1, };
-- 
2.17.0

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