On Apr 30, 2018, at 16:56, Wenwen Wang <wang6...@umn.edu> wrote:
>
> In ll_dir_ioctl(), the object lumv3 is firstly copied from the user space
> using Its address, i.e., lumv1 = &lumv3. If the lmm_magic field of lumv3 is
> LOV_USER_MAGIC_V3, lumv3 will be modified by the second copy from the user
> space. The second copy is necessary, because the two versions (i.e.,
> lov_user_md_v1 and lov_user_md_v3) have different data formats and lengths.
> However, given that the user data resides in the user space, a malicious
> user-space process can race to change the data between the two copies. By
> doing so, the attacker can provide a data with an inconsistent version,
> e.g., v1 version + v3 data. This can lead to logical errors in the
> following execution in ll_dir_setstripe(), which performs different actions
> according to the version specified by the field lmm_magic.
>
> This patch rechecks the version field lmm_magic in the second copy. If the
> version is not as expected, i.e., LOV_USER_MAGIC_V3, an error code will be
> returned: -EINVAL.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6...@umn.edu>
Thanks for the updated patch.
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <andreas.dil...@intel.com>
> ---
> drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/dir.c | 2 ++
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/dir.c
> b/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/dir.c
> index d10d272..80d44ca 100644
> --- a/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/dir.c
> +++ b/drivers/staging/lustre/lustre/llite/dir.c
> @@ -1185,6 +1185,8 @@ static long ll_dir_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned
> int cmd, unsigned long arg)
> if (lumv1->lmm_magic == LOV_USER_MAGIC_V3) {
> if (copy_from_user(&lumv3, lumv3p, sizeof(lumv3)))
> return -EFAULT;
> + if (lumv3.lmm_magic != LOV_USER_MAGIC_V3)
> + return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> if (is_root_inode(inode))
> --
> 2.7.4
>
Cheers, Andreas
--
Andreas Dilger
Lustre Principal Architect
Intel Corporation
