On Thu, May 03, 2018 at 10:23:49PM -0400, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote: > On Fri, May 04, 2018 at 09:07:37AM +1000, Tobin C. Harding wrote: > > Currently if an attempt is made to print a pointer before there is > > enough entropy then '(____ptrval____)' is printed. This makes debugging > > stack traces during early boot difficult. > > > > It was observed that we can relax the requirement for cryptographically > > secure hashing when debugging while still maintaining pointer hashing > > behaviour. This allows kernels to be debugged without developers > > relying on different pointer printing behavior. > > > > Using the hw RNG if available solves this problem for those machines > > that have a hardware RNG, we would like to solve it for _all_ machines. > > > > Patch 1 - Whitespace fixes. > > Patch 2 - Fix get_random_bytes_arch() > > Patch 3 - Use hw RNG for pointer hashing if available (by default). > > Patch 4 - Use insecure hashing with command line option 'debug_early_boot'. > > What tree are these patches going in? It seems to be equally split > between random and core kernel code. I'm happy taking it in via the > random tree, or if it goes in some other patch (I've already ack'ed > the random changes). I just want to make sure other folks aren't > assuming I was going take the patches, while I was assuming it would > go to Linus some other way.
Thanks for verifying this Ted, I was wondering the same thing. Perhaps this set should be split up, patch 4 is not related to the first three. Assuming no comments come in over the next few days it looks like people are ok with the first 3 patches, perhaps you could take those through your tree (I can resend separately if easier for you). I could then re-spin the final patch a few more times and perhaps Andrew would take it through his tree? Feel free to violently correct me, I'm still learning the ins-and-outs of the patch pathway to Linus. thanks, Tobin.
