4.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.w...@oracle.com> commit 5cf687548705412da47c9cec342fd952d71ed3d5 upstream A guest may modify the SPEC_CTRL MSR from the value used by the kernel. Since the kernel doesn't use IBRS, this means a value of zero is what is needed in the host. But the 336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf refers to the other bits as reserved so the kernel should respect the boot time SPEC_CTRL value and use that. This allows to deal with future extensions to the SPEC_CTRL interface if any at all. Note: This uses wrmsrl() instead of native_wrmsl(). I does not make any difference as paravirt will over-write the callq *0xfff.. with the wrmsrl assembler code. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.w...@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <b...@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 ++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 6 ++---- arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 6 ++---- 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -228,6 +228,16 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation { extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64); extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void); +/* + * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR + * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This + * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or + * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case. + * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter. + */ +extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64); +extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64); + extern char __indirect_thunk_start[]; extern char __indirect_thunk_end[]; --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -123,6 +123,24 @@ u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_get_default); +void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64 guest_spec_ctrl) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return; + if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, guest_spec_ctrl); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest); + +void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64 guest_spec_ctrl) +{ + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) + return; + if (x86_spec_ctrl_base != guest_spec_ctrl) + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host); + #ifdef RETPOLINE static bool spectre_v2_bad_module; --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -5015,8 +5015,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr * being speculatively taken. */ - if (svm->spec_ctrl) - native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl); + x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(svm->spec_ctrl); asm volatile ( "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t" @@ -5128,8 +5127,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) svm->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - if (svm->spec_ctrl) - native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(svm->spec_ctrl); /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB(); --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c @@ -9452,8 +9452,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr * being speculatively taken. */ - if (vmx->spec_ctrl) - native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, vmx->spec_ctrl); + x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl); vmx->__launched = vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched; asm( @@ -9591,8 +9590,7 @@ static void __noclone vmx_vcpu_run(struc if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))) vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL); - if (vmx->spec_ctrl) - native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0); + x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl); /* Eliminate branch target predictions from guest mode */ vmexit_fill_RSB();