On 30 May 2018 at 11:14, Will Deacon <will.dea...@arm.com> wrote: > On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 12:48:06PM +0800, YaoJun wrote: >> To protect against KSMA(Kernel Space Mirroring Attack), make >> tramp_pg_dir read-only. The principle of KSMA is to insert a >> carefully constructed PGD entry into the translation table. >> The type of this entry is block, which maps the kernel text >> and its access permissions bits are 01. The user process can >> then modify kernel text directly through this mapping. In this >> way, an arbitrary write can be converted to multiple arbitrary >> writes. >> >> Signed-off-by: YaoJun <yaojun8558...@gmail.com> >> --- >> arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c | 4 ++++ >> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c >> index 2dbb2c9f1ec1..ac4b22c7e435 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c >> +++ b/arch/arm64/mm/mmu.c >> @@ -551,6 +551,10 @@ static int __init map_entry_trampoline(void) >> __create_pgd_mapping(tramp_pg_dir, pa_start, TRAMP_VALIAS, PAGE_SIZE, >> prot, pgd_pgtable_alloc, 0); >> >> + update_mapping_prot(__pa_symbol(tramp_pg_dir), >> + (unsigned long)tramp_pg_dir, >> + PGD_SIZE, PAGE_KERNEL_RO); > > Hmm, I like the idea but is there a risk that the page table has been mapped > as part of a block entry, which we can't safely split at this point (i.e. > we'll run into one of the BUG_ONs in the mapping code)? >
We'd need to create a separate segment for it initially so the mapping is already at the right granularity.
