Only report mitigation present if hardening callback has been
successfully installed.
Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykau...@suse.de>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index 92616431ae4e..8469d3be7b15 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -481,7 +481,8 @@ multi_entry_cap_cpu_enable(const struct
arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
caps->cpu_enable(caps);
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
+#if defined(CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR) || \
+ defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES)
/*
* List of CPUs where we need to issue a psci call to
@@ -712,4 +713,35 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct
device_attribute *attr,
return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n");
}
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ u64 pfr0;
+ struct bp_hardening_data *data;
+
+ pfr0 = read_cpuid(ID_AA64PFR0_EL1);
+ if (cpuid_feature_extract_unsigned_field(pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_CSV2_SHIFT))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+ if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR)) {
+ /*
+ * Hardware is vulnerable. Lets check if bp hardening callback
+ * has been successfully installed
+ */
+ data = arm64_get_bp_hardening_data();
+ if (data && data->fn)
+ return sprintf(buf,
+ "Mitigation: Branch predictor hardening");
+ else
+ /* For example SMCCC_VERSION_1_0 */
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+ }
+
+ /* In case CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is not enabled */
+ if (is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), arm64_bp_harden_smccc_cpus))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
#endif
--
2.11.0
