From: J. Bruce Fields <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Allow root squashing to vary per-pseudoflavor, so that you can (for
example) allow root access only when sufficiently strong security is in
use.
Signed-off-by: "J. Bruce Fields" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Signed-off-by: Neil Brown <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
### Diffstat output
./fs/nfsd/auth.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
./include/linux/nfsd/export.h | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff .prev/fs/nfsd/auth.c ./fs/nfsd/auth.c
--- .prev/fs/nfsd/auth.c 2007-07-10 12:18:33.000000000 +1000
+++ ./fs/nfsd/auth.c 2007-07-10 12:19:40.000000000 +1000
@@ -12,17 +12,31 @@
#define CAP_NFSD_MASK (CAP_FS_MASK|CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE))
+static int nfsexp_flags(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
+{
+ struct exp_flavor_info *f;
+ struct exp_flavor_info *end = exp->ex_flavors + exp->ex_nflavors;
+
+ for (f = exp->ex_flavors; f < end; f++) {
+ if (f->pseudoflavor == rqstp->rq_flavor)
+ return f->flags;
+ }
+ return exp->ex_flags;
+
+}
+
int nfsd_setuser(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp)
{
struct svc_cred cred = rqstp->rq_cred;
int i;
+ int flags = nfsexp_flags(rqstp, exp);
int ret;
- if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_ALLSQUASH) {
+ if (flags & NFSEXP_ALLSQUASH) {
cred.cr_uid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
cred.cr_gid = exp->ex_anon_gid;
cred.cr_group_info = groups_alloc(0);
- } else if (exp->ex_flags & NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH) {
+ } else if (flags & NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH) {
struct group_info *gi;
if (!cred.cr_uid)
cred.cr_uid = exp->ex_anon_uid;
diff .prev/include/linux/nfsd/export.h ./include/linux/nfsd/export.h
--- .prev/include/linux/nfsd/export.h 2007-07-10 12:18:33.000000000 +1000
+++ ./include/linux/nfsd/export.h 2007-07-10 12:19:40.000000000 +1000
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@
#define NFSEXP_ALLFLAGS 0xFE3F
/* The flags that may vary depending on security flavor: */
-#define NFSEXP_SECINFO_FLAGS NFSEXP_READONLY
+#define NFSEXP_SECINFO_FLAGS (NFSEXP_READONLY | NFSEXP_ROOTSQUASH \
+ | NFSEXP_ALLSQUASH)
#ifdef __KERNEL__
-
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