On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 07:40:10PM -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
[...]
> >>>>>>> I see two reasonable solutions:
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> 1. Don’t fiddle with the struct file at all. Instead make the inode
> >>>>>>> flag
> >>>>>>> work by itself.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Currently, the various VFS paths check only the struct file's f_mode
> >>>>>> to deny
> >>>>>> writes of already opened files. This would mean more checking in all
> >>>>>> those
> >>>>>> paths (and modification of all those paths).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Anyway going with that idea, we could
> >>>>>> 1. call deny_write_access(file) from the memfd's seal path which
> >>>>>> decrements
> >>>>>> the inode::i_writecount.
> >>>>>> 2. call get_write_access(inode) in the various VFS paths in addition to
> >>>>>> checking for FMODE_*WRITE and deny the write (incase i_writecount is
> >>>>>> negative)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> That will prevent both reopens, and writes from succeeding. However I
> >>>>>> worry a
> >>>>>> bit about 2 not being too familiar with VFS internals, about what the
> >>>>>> consequences of doing that may be.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> IMHO, modifying both the inode and the struct file separately is fine,
> >>>>> since they mean different things. In regular filesystems, it's fine to
> >>>>> have a read-write open file description for a file whose inode grants
> >>>>> write permission to nobody. Speaking of which: is fchmod enough to
> >>>>> prevent this attack?
> >>>>
> >>>> Well, yes and no. fchmod does prevent reopening the file RW, but
> >>>> anyone with permissions (owner, CAP_FOWNER) can just fchmod it back. A
> >>>> seal is supposed to be irrevocable, so fchmod-as-inode-seal probably
> >>>> isn't sufficient by itself. While it might be good enough for Android
> >>>> (in the sense that it'll prevent RW-reopens from other security
> >>>> contexts to which we send an open memfd file), it's still conceptually
> >>>> ugly, IMHO. Let's go with the original approach of just tweaking the
> >>>> inode so that open-for-write is permanently blocked.
> >>>
> >>> Agreed with the idea of modifying both file and inode flags. I was
> >>> thinking
> >>> modifying i_mode may do the trick but as you pointed it probably could be
> >>> reverted by chmod or some other attribute setting calls.
> >>>
> >>> OTOH, I don't think deny_write_access(file) can be reverted from any
> >>> user-facing path so we could do that from the seal to prevent the future
> >>> opens in write mode. I'll double check and test that out tomorrow.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>
> >> This seems considerably more complicated and more fragile than needed. Just
> >> add a new F_SEAL_WRITE_FUTURE. Grep for F_SEAL_WRITE and make the _FUTURE
> >> variant work exactly like it with two exceptions:
> >>
> >> - shmem_mmap and maybe its hugetlbfs equivalent should check for it and act
> >> accordingly.
> >
> > There's more to it than that, we also need to block future writes through
> > write syscall, so we have to hook into the write path too once the seal is
> > set, not just the mmap. That means we have to add code in mm/shmem.c to do
> > that in all those handlers, to check for the seal (and hope we didn't miss a
> > file_operations handler). Is that what you are proposing?
>
> The existing code already does this. That’s why I suggested grepping :)
>
> >
> > Also, it means we have to keep CONFIG_TMPFS enabled so that the
> > shmem_file_operations write handlers like write_iter are hooked up.
> > Currently
> > memfd works even with !CONFIG_TMPFS.
>
> If so, that sounds like it may already be a bug.
>
> >
> >> - add_seals won’t need the wait_for_pins and mapping_deny_write logic.
> >>
> >> That really should be all that’s needed.
> >
> > It seems a fair idea what you're saying. But I don't see how its less
> > complex.. IMO its far more simple to have VFS do the denial of the
> > operations
> > based on the flags of its datastructures.. and if it works (which I will
> > test
> > to be sure it will), then we should be good.
>
> I agree it’s complicated, but the code is already written. You should just
> need to adjust some masks.
>
Its actually not that bad and a great idea, I did something like the
following and it works pretty well. I would say its cleaner than the old
approach for sure (and I also added a /proc/pid/fd/N reopen test to the
selftest and made sure that issue goes away).
Side note: One subtelty I discovered from the existing selftests is once the
F_SEAL_WRITE are active, an mmap of PROT_READ and MAP_SHARED region is
expected to fail. This is also evident from this code in mmap_region:
if (vm_flags & VM_SHARED) {
error = mapping_map_writable(file->f_mapping);
if (error)
goto allow_write_and_free_vma;
}
---8<-----------------------
From: "Joel Fernandes (Google)" <j...@joelfernandes.org>
Subject: [PATCH] mm/memfd: implement future write seal using shmem ops
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <j...@joelfernandes.org>
---
fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c | 2 +-
mm/memfd.c | 19 -------------------
mm/shmem.c | 13 ++++++++++---
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
index 32920a10100e..1978581abfdf 100644
--- a/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ static long hugetlbfs_punch_hole(struct inode *inode,
loff_t offset, loff_t len)
inode_lock(inode);
/* protected by i_mutex */
- if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) {
+ if (info->seals & (F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) {
inode_unlock(inode);
return -EPERM;
}
diff --git a/mm/memfd.c b/mm/memfd.c
index 5ba9804e9515..a9ece5fab439 100644
--- a/mm/memfd.c
+++ b/mm/memfd.c
@@ -220,25 +220,6 @@ static int memfd_add_seals(struct file *file, unsigned int
seals)
}
}
- if ((seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) &&
- !(*file_seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE)) {
- /*
- * The FUTURE_WRITE seal also prevents growing and shrinking
- * so we need them to be already set, or requested now.
- */
- int test_seals = (seals | *file_seals) &
- (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK);
-
- if (test_seals != (F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_SHRINK)) {
- error = -EINVAL;
- goto unlock;
- }
-
- spin_lock(&file->f_lock);
- file->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_WRITE | FMODE_PWRITE);
- spin_unlock(&file->f_lock);
- }
-
*file_seals |= seals;
error = 0;
diff --git a/mm/shmem.c b/mm/shmem.c
index 446942677cd4..7dad7efd8b99 100644
--- a/mm/shmem.c
+++ b/mm/shmem.c
@@ -2163,6 +2163,12 @@ int shmem_lock(struct file *file, int lock, struct
user_struct *user)
static int shmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
+ struct shmem_inode_info *info = SHMEM_I(file_inode(file));
+
+ /* New shared mmaps are not allowed when "future write" seal active. */
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) && (info->seals & F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE))
+ return -EPERM;
+
file_accessed(file);
vma->vm_ops = &shmem_vm_ops;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGE_PAGECACHE) &&
@@ -2391,8 +2397,9 @@ shmem_write_begin(struct file *file, struct address_space
*mapping,
pgoff_t index = pos >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* i_mutex is held by caller */
- if (unlikely(info->seals & (F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_GROW))) {
- if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
+ if (unlikely(info->seals & (F_SEAL_GROW |
+ F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE))) {
+ if (info->seals & (F_SEAL_WRITE | F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE))
return -EPERM;
if ((info->seals & F_SEAL_GROW) && pos + len > inode->i_size)
return -EPERM;
@@ -2657,7 +2664,7 @@ static long shmem_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode,
loff_t offset,
DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD_ONSTACK(shmem_falloc_waitq);
/* protected by i_mutex */
- if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE) {
+ if (info->seals & F_SEAL_WRITE || info->seals &
F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE) {
error = -EPERM;
goto out;
}
--
2.19.1.930.g4563a0d9d0-goog
