The fault handling code tries to validate that a page fault from
user mode that would extend the stack is within a certain range of
the user SP. regs->sp is only equal to the user SP if
user_mode(regs). In the extremely unlikely event that that
sw_error_code had the USER bit set but the faulting instruction was
in the kernel (i.e. the faulting instruction was WRUSS), then the
*kernel* stack pointer would have been checked, which would be an
info leak.
Note to -stable maintainers: don't backport this unless you backport
CET. The bug it fixes is unobservable in current kernels.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 91d4d2722f2e..eae7ee3ce89b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -1377,7 +1377,7 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,
bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address);
return;
}
- if (sw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) {
+ if (user_mode(regs)) {
/*
* Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug.
* The large cushion allows instructions like enter
--
2.17.2
