The checks to cpu_smt_control outside of kernel/cpu.c can be converted
to use cpu_smt_enabled key to run SMT specific code.
Save the export of cpu_smt_control and convert usage of cpu_smt_control
to cpu_smt_enabled outside of kernel/cpu.c.
Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.c...@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 13 +++++++------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +-
include/linux/cpu.h | 12 +++---------
kernel/cpu.c | 11 +++++++++--
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index a63456a..3e5ae2c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -353,15 +353,16 @@ void arch_smt_update(void)
mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base;
- if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+ if (cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug)
mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
else
mask &= ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
if (mask != x86_spec_ctrl_base) {
- pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation: %s STIBP\n",
- cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ?
- "Enabling" : "Disabling");
+ if (cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug)
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation:
Enabling STIBP\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 cross-process SMT mitigation:
Disabling STIBP\n");
x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
}
@@ -844,13 +845,13 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
(l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
- cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
+ cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug))
return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
- cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" :
"disabled");
+ cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
}
#else
static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 4555077..6c71d4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -11607,7 +11607,7 @@ static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
* Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
* insecure environment.
*/
- if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+ if (cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug)
pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index ce8267e..6f43024 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -170,20 +170,14 @@ void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void);
static inline void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void) { }
#endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
-enum cpuhp_smt_control {
- CPU_SMT_ENABLED,
- CPU_SMT_DISABLED,
- CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED,
- CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED,
-};
-
#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT)
-extern enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control;
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(cpu_smt_enabled);
+#define cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug (static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
extern void cpu_smt_disable(bool force);
extern void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void);
extern void cpu_smt_check_topology(void);
#else
-# define cpu_smt_control (CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+#define cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug false
static inline void cpu_smt_disable(bool force) { }
static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void) { }
static inline void cpu_smt_check_topology(void) { }
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index e216154..f846416 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -368,8 +368,15 @@ static void lockdep_release_cpus_lock(void)
#endif /* CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
-enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_control);
+
+enum cpuhp_smt_control {
+ CPU_SMT_ENABLED,
+ CPU_SMT_DISABLED,
+ CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED,
+ CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
+static enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(cpu_smt_enabled);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_smt_enabled);
--
2.9.4
