4.19-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Thomas Gleixner t...@linutronix.de commit 46f7ecb1e7359f183f5bbd1e08b90e10e52164f9 upstream The IBPB control code in x86 removed the usage. Remove the functionality which was introduced for this. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mi...@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <pet...@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <l...@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torva...@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jkos...@suse.cz> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lenda...@amd.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoim...@redhat.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarca...@redhat.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <d...@amazon.co.uk> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.c...@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <a...@linux.intel.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.han...@intel.com> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey.schauf...@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mall...@intel.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <ar...@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jon Masters <j...@redhat.com> Cc: Waiman Long <longman9...@gmail.com> Cc: Greg KH <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dave Stewart <david.c.stew...@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181125185005.559149...@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> --- include/linux/ptrace.h | 17 ----------------- kernel/ptrace.c | 10 ---------- 2 files changed, 27 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/ptrace.h +++ b/include/linux/ptrace.h @@ -64,15 +64,12 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_stru #define PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT 0x04 #define PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS 0x08 #define PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS 0x10 -#define PTRACE_MODE_SCHED 0x20 -#define PTRACE_MODE_IBPB 0x40 /* shorthands for READ/ATTACH and FSCREDS/REALCREDS combinations */ #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS) -#define PTRACE_MODE_SPEC_IBPB (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS | PTRACE_MODE_IBPB) /** * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access @@ -90,20 +87,6 @@ extern void exit_ptrace(struct task_stru */ extern bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); -/** - * ptrace_may_access - check whether the caller is permitted to access - * a target task. - * @task: target task - * @mode: selects type of access and caller credentials - * - * Returns true on success, false on denial. - * - * Similar to ptrace_may_access(). Only to be called from context switch - * code. Does not call into audit and the regular LSM hooks due to locking - * constraints. - */ -extern bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode); - static inline int ptrace_reparented(struct task_struct *child) { return !same_thread_group(child->real_parent, child->parent); --- a/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -261,9 +261,6 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct ta static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode) { - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) - return false; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE); else @@ -331,16 +328,9 @@ ok: !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode))) return -EPERM; - if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_SCHED) - return 0; return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode); } -bool ptrace_may_access_sched(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) -{ - return __ptrace_may_access(task, mode | PTRACE_MODE_SCHED); -} - bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode) { int err;
