From: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykau...@suse.de> Return status based no ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature. Return string "Unknown" in case CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD is disabled or arch workaround2 is not available in the firmware.
Signed-off-by: Mian Yousaf Kaukab <ykau...@suse.de> [Added SSBS logic] Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.lin...@arm.com> --- arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c index 6505c93d507e..8aeb5ca38db8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c @@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN; return false; + /* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */ case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED: pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc); ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED; @@ -828,4 +829,31 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, } } +ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, + struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) +{ + /* + * Two assumptions: First, get_ssbd_state() reflects the worse case + * for hetrogenous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its + * supported by all cores. + */ + switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) { + case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED: + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + + case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL: + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE: + if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) + return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); + return sprintf(buf, + "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n"); + + case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_DISABLE: + return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + + default: /* ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN*/ + return sprintf(buf, "Unknown\n"); + } +} + #endif -- 2.17.2