[ Re-sending the message because my first reply bounced - Guenther had
mis-typed the lkml address ]
On Sun, Jan 6, 2019 at 10:09 AM Guenter Roeck <li...@roeck-us.net> wrote:
>
> All alpha and sh4 (big and little endian) images fail to boot in qemu
> with this patch applied. Reverting it fixes the problem.
Funky. 99% of that patch is a complete no-op on non-x86.
The one exception is the strncpy_from_user() and strnlen_user() cases,
which didn't use to do access_ok() at all, and now essentially do.
But I think I see what may be the problem. I think the alpha version
of "access_ok()" is buggy.
Lookie here:
#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
((get_fs().seg & (addr | size | (addr+size))) == 0)
and what it basically tests is of any of the high bits get set (the
USER_DS value is 0xfffffc0000000000).
And that's completely wrong for the "addr+size" check. It's off-by-one
for the case where we check to the very end of the user address space,
which is exactly what the strn*_user() functions do.
Why? Because "addr+size" will be exactly the size of the address
space, so trying to access the last byte of the user address space
will *fail* the __access_ok() check, even though it shouldn't.
So it's not really that that commit is buggy in itself, but it
triggers that off-by-one error in access_ok().
Side note: that alpha macro is buggy for another reason too: it
re-uses the arguments twice.
And SH has almost the exact same bug:
#define __addr_ok(addr) \
((unsigned long __force)(addr) < current_thread_info()->addr_limit.seg)
so far so good: yes, a user address must be below the limit. But then:
#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
(__addr_ok((addr) + (size)))
is wrong with the exact same off-by-one case: the case when
"addr+size" is exactly _equal_ to the limit is actually perfectly
fine.
The SH version is actually seriously buggy in another way: it doesn't
actually check for overflow, even though it did copy the _comment_
that talks about overflow.
So it turns out that both SH and alpha actually have completely
buggered implementations of access_ok(), but they happened to work
(although the SH overflow one is a serious serious security bug, not
that anybody likely cares about SH security)
Ho humm.
Maybe something like the attached patch? Entirely untested, I don't
have a cross-build environment, much less a boot setup.
It isn't trying to be clever, the end address is based on this logic:
unsigned long __ao_end = __ao_a + __ao_b - !!__ao_b; \
which basically says "subtract one unless the length was zero".
For a lot of access_ok() users the length is a constant, so this isn't
actually as expensive as it initially looks.
Does that fix things for you?
Linus
arch/alpha/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 +++++---
arch/sh/include/asm/uaccess.h | 7 +++++--
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/uaccess.h
index e69c4e13c328..cf4ac791a592 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -30,11 +30,13 @@
* Address valid if:
* - "addr" doesn't have any high-bits set
* - AND "size" doesn't have any high-bits set
- * - AND "addr+size" doesn't have any high-bits set
+ * - AND "addr+size-(size != 0)" doesn't have any high-bits set
* - OR we are in kernel mode.
*/
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
- ((get_fs().seg & (addr | size | (addr+size))) == 0)
+#define __access_ok(addr, size) ({ \
+ unsigned long __ao_a = (addr), __ao_b = (size); \
+ unsigned long __ao_end = __ao_a + __ao_b - !!__ao_b; \
+ (get_fs().seg & (__ao_a | __ao_b | __ao_end)) == 0; })
#define access_ok(addr, size) \
({ \
diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/uaccess.h
index deebbfab5342..5fe751ad7582 100644
--- a/arch/sh/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -16,8 +16,11 @@
* sum := addr + size; carry? --> flag = true;
* if (sum >= addr_limit) flag = true;
*/
-#define __access_ok(addr, size) \
- (__addr_ok((addr) + (size)))
+#define __access_ok(addr, size) ({ \
+ unsigned long __ao_a = (addr), __ao_b = (size); \
+ unsigned long __ao_end = __ao_a + __ao_b - !!__ao_b; \
+ __ao_end >= __ao_a && __addr_ok(__ao_end); })
+
#define access_ok(addr, size) \
(__chk_user_ptr(addr), \
__access_ok((unsigned long __force)(addr), (size)))
