3.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com> [ Upstream commit d81c5054a5d1d4999c7cdead7636b6cd4af83d36 ] At least old Xen net backends seem to send frags with no real data sometimes. In case such a fragment happens to occur with the frag limit already reached the frontend will BUG currently even if this situation is easily recoverable. Modify the BUG_ON() condition accordingly. Tested-by: Dietmar Hahn <dietmar.h...@ts.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgr...@suse.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <da...@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org> --- drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ static RING_IDX xennet_fill_frags(struct if (skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags == MAX_SKB_FRAGS) { unsigned int pull_to = NETFRONT_SKB_CB(skb)->pull_to; - BUG_ON(pull_to <= skb_headlen(skb)); + BUG_ON(pull_to < skb_headlen(skb)); __pskb_pull_tail(skb, pull_to - skb_headlen(skb)); } BUG_ON(skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags >= MAX_SKB_FRAGS);