On Fri, Jan 18, 2019 at 05:14:39PM +0100, Jann Horn wrote:
> When you e.g. run `find` on a directory for which getdents returns
> "filenames" that contain slashes, `find` passes those "filenames" back to
> the kernel, which then interprets them as paths. That could conceivably
> cause userspace to do something bad when accessing something like an
> untrusted USB stick, but I'm not aware of any specific example.
>
> Instead of returning bogus filenames to userspace, return -EUCLEAN.
>
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <ja...@google.com>
> ---
> I ordered this fix before the refactoring one so that it can easily be
> backported.
>
> changed in v2:
> - move bogus_dirent_name() out of the #ifdef (kbuild test robot)
> changed in v3:
> - change calling convention (Al Viro)
> - comment fix
> changed in v4:
> - use EFSCORRUPTED instead of EUCLEAN (Dave Chinner)
>
> arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c | 4 ++++
> fs/readdir.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++
> 3 files changed, 41 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
> index 792586038808..db1c2144d477 100644
> --- a/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
> +++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/osf_sys.c
> @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
> #include <linux/vfs.h>
> #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
> #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/fs.h>
>
> #include <asm/fpu.h>
> #include <asm/io.h>
> @@ -117,6 +118,9 @@ osf_filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name,
> int namlen,
> unsigned int reclen = ALIGN(NAME_OFFSET + namlen + 1, sizeof(u32));
> unsigned int d_ino;
>
> + buf->error = check_dirent_name(name, namlen);
> + if (unlikely(buf->error))
> + return -EFSCORRUPTED;
> buf->error = -EINVAL; /* only used if we fail */
> if (reclen > buf->count)
> return -EINVAL;
> diff --git a/fs/readdir.c b/fs/readdir.c
> index 2f6a4534e0df..58088510bb9c 100644
> --- a/fs/readdir.c
> +++ b/fs/readdir.c
> @@ -64,6 +64,26 @@ int iterate_dir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
> }
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(iterate_dir);
>
> +/*
> + * Most filesystems don't filter out bogus directory entry names, and
> userspace
> + * can get very confused by such names. Behave as if a filesystem error had
> + * happened while reading directory entries.
> + */
> +int check_dirent_name(const char *name, int namlen)
> +{
> + if (namlen == 0) {
> + pr_err_once("%s: filesystem returned bogus empty name\n",
> + __func__);
> + return -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + }
> + if (memchr(name, '/', namlen)) {
> + pr_err_once("%s: filesystem returned bogus name '%*pEhp'
> (contains slash)\n",
> + __func__, namlen, name);
> + return -EFSCORRUPTED;
> + }
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Traditional linux readdir() handling..
> *
> @@ -98,6 +118,9 @@ static int fillonedir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char
> *name, int namlen,
>
> if (buf->result)
> return -EINVAL;
> + buf->result = check_dirent_name(name, namlen);
> + if (unlikely(buf->result))
> + return -EFSCORRUPTED;
Why bother returning an error from check_dirent_name() if you just
throw it away? i.e:
if (!dirent_name_valid(name, namelen))
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
Cheers,
Dave.
--
Dave Chinner
da...@fromorbit.com
