Return status based on ssbd_state and the arm64 SSBS feature. If
the mitigation is disabled, or the firmware isn't responding then
return the expected machine state based on a new blacklist of known
vulnerable cores.

Signed-off-by: Jeremy Linton <[email protected]>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index caedf268c972..e9ae8e5fd7e1 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ static int detect_harden_bp_fw(void)
 DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u64, arm64_ssbd_callback_required);
 
 int ssbd_state __read_mostly = ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL;
+static bool __ssb_safe = true;
 
 static const struct ssbd_options {
        const char      *str;
@@ -362,10 +363,16 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct 
arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
 {
        struct arm_smccc_res res;
        bool required = true;
+       bool is_vul;
        s32 val;
 
        WARN_ON(scope != SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU || preemptible());
 
+       is_vul = is_midr_in_range_list(read_cpuid_id(), entry->midr_range_list);
+
+       if (is_vul)
+               __ssb_safe = false;
+
        if (this_cpu_has_cap(ARM64_SSBS)) {
                required = false;
                goto out_printmsg;
@@ -399,6 +406,7 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct 
arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
                ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_UNKNOWN;
                return false;
 
+       /* machines with mixed mitigation requirements must not return this */
        case SMCCC_RET_NOT_REQUIRED:
                pr_info_once("%s mitigation not required\n", entry->desc);
                ssbd_state = ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED;
@@ -454,6 +462,16 @@ static bool has_ssbd_mitigation(const struct 
arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry,
        return required;
 }
 
+/* known vulnerable cores */
+static const struct midr_range arm64_ssb_cpus[] = {
+       MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A57),
+       MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+       MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A73),
+       MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A75),
+       MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A76),
+       {},
+};
+
 static void __maybe_unused
 cpu_enable_cache_maint_trap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 {
@@ -743,6 +761,7 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
                .capability = ARM64_SSBD,
                .type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
                .matches = has_ssbd_mitigation,
+               .midr_range_list = arm64_ssb_cpus,
        },
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873
        {
@@ -784,4 +803,30 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct 
device_attribute *attr,
        return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev,
+               struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+       /*
+        *  Two assumptions: First, get_ssbd_state() reflects the worse case
+        *  for hetrogenous machines, and that if SSBS is supported its
+        *  supported by all cores.
+        */
+       switch (arm64_get_ssbd_state()) {
+       case ARM64_SSBD_MITIGATED:
+               return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+       case ARM64_SSBD_KERNEL:
+       case ARM64_SSBD_FORCE_ENABLE:
+               if (cpus_have_cap(ARM64_SSBS))
+                       return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+               return sprintf(buf,
+                       "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled\n");
+       }
+
+       if (__ssb_safe)
+               return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+       return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
 #endif
-- 
2.17.2

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