Stephen Smalley <s...@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > > @@ -6560,6 +6560,7 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, > > { > > struct key *key; > > struct key_security_struct *ksec; > > + unsigned oldstyle_perm; > > u32 sid; > > /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the > > @@ -6568,13 +6569,26 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, > > if (perm == 0) > > return 0; > > + oldstyle_perm = perm & (KEY_NEED_VIEW | KEY_NEED_READ | KEY_NEED_WRITE > > | > > + KEY_NEED_SEARCH | KEY_NEED_LINK); > > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_SETSEC) > > + oldstyle_perm |= OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR; > > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_INVAL) > > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH; > > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_REVOKE && !(perm & OLD_KEY_NEED_SETATTR)) > > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE; > > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_JOIN) > > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_SEARCH; > > + if (perm & KEY_NEED_CLEAR) > > + oldstyle_perm |= KEY_NEED_WRITE; > > + > > sid = cred_sid(cred); > > key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); > > ksec = key->security; > > return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, > > - sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); > > + sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, oldstyle_perm, NULL); > > This might be ok temporarily for compatibility but we'll want to ultimately > define the new permissions in SELinux and switch over to using them if a new > policy capability bit is set to indicate that the policy supports them. We > should probably decouple the SELinux permission bits from the KEY_NEED_* > values and explicitly map them all at the same time.
Sounds reasonable. I should probably detach the first two ACL patches from the set and push them separately. David