On Thu, 2019-02-28 at 17:01 -0800, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > That's not a valid reason for preventing systems that do use IMA for > > verifying the kexec kernel image signature or kernel module signatures > > from enabling "lock down". This just means that there needs to be > > some coordination between the different signature verification > > methods. [1][2] > > I agree, but the current form of the integration makes it impossible > for anyone using an IMA-enabled kernel (but not using IMA) to do > anything unless they have IMA signatures. It's a problem we need to > solve, I just don't think it's a problem we need to solve before > merging the patchset.
That's simply not true. Have you even looked at the IMA architecture patches? fcf338449af5 x86/ima: require signed kernel modules d958083a8f64 x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 Mimi
