On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 06:05:47PM -0500, Jeremy Linton wrote: > Arm64 machines should be displaying a human readable > vulnerability status to speculative execution attacks in > /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities > > This series enables that behavior by providing the expected > functions. Those functions expose the cpu errata and feature > states, as well as whether firmware is responding appropriately > to display the overall machine status. This means that in a > heterogeneous machine we will only claim the machine is mitigated > or safe if we are confident all booted cores are safe or > mitigated. > > v5->v6: > Invert meltdown logic to display that a core is safe rather > than mitigated if the mitigation has been enabled on > machines that are safe. This can happen when the > mitigation was forced on via command line or KASLR. > This means that in order to detect if kpti is enabled > other methods must be used (look at dmesg) when the > machine isn't itself susceptible to meltdown. > Trivial whitespace tweaks.
The v6 logic looks fine to me. For the whole series: Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.mari...@arm.com>
