On Wed, 17 Apr 2019 13:53:42 +0200
Petr Mladek <[email protected]> wrote:
> restricted_pointer() pretends that it prints the address when kptr_restrict
> is set to zero. But it is never called in this situation. Instead,
> pointer() falls back to ptr_to_id() and hashes the pointer.
>
> This patch removes the potential confusion. klp_restrict is checked only
> in restricted_pointer().
>
> It actually fixes a small race when the address might get printed unhashed:
>
> CPU0 CPU1
>
> pointer()
> if (!kptr_restrict)
> /* for example set to 2 */
> restricted_pointer()
> /* echo 0 >/proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict */
> proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin()
> klpr_restrict = 0;
> switch(kptr_restrict)
> case 0:
> break:
>
> number()
>
> Fixes: commit ef0010a30935de4e0211 ("vsprintf: don't use
> 'restricted_pointer()' when not restricting")
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
> Cc: Tobin Harding <[email protected]>
> Cc: Kees Cook <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <[email protected]>
> Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <[email protected]>
-- Steve
> ---
> lib/vsprintf.c | 6 ++----
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
> index eb7b4a06e1f0..2af48948a973 100644
> --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
> +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
> @@ -725,8 +725,8 @@ char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void
> *ptr,
> {
> switch (kptr_restrict) {
> case 0:
> - /* Always print %pK values */
> - break;
> + /* Handle as %p, hash and do _not_ leak addresses. */
> + return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
> case 1: {
> const struct cred *cred;
>
> @@ -2041,8 +2041,6 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end,
> void *ptr,
> return buf;
> }
> case 'K':
> - if (!kptr_restrict)
> - break;
> return restricted_pointer(buf, end, ptr, spec);
> case 'N':
> return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, spec, fmt);
