Hi Andy,
> From: Andy Lutomirski [mailto:l...@kernel.org]
> Sent: Thursday, May 23, 2019 6:18 PM
>
> On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 4:40 PM Sean Christopherson
> <sean.j.christopher...@intel.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 08:38:17AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > > On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 7:17 AM Sean Christopherson
> > > <sean.j.christopher...@intel.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Thu, May 23, 2019 at 01:26:28PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 07:35:17PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > > > > > But actually, there's no need to disallow mmap() after ECREATE
> > > > > > since the LSM checks also apply to mmap(), e.g. FILE__EXECUTE
> > > > > > would be needed to
> > > > > > mmap() any enclave pages PROT_EXEC. I guess my past self
> > > > > > thought mmap() bypassed LSM checks? The real problem is that
> > > > > > mmap()'ng an existing enclave would require FILE__WRITE and
> > > > > > FILE__EXECUTE, which puts us back at square one.
> > > > >
> > > > > I'm lost with the constraints we want to set.
> > > >
> > > > As is today, SELinux policies would require enclave loaders to
> > > > have FILE__WRITE and FILE__EXECUTE permissions on
> > > > /dev/sgx/enclave. Presumably other LSMs have similar
> > > > requirements. Requiring all processes to have
> > > > FILE__{WRITE,EXECUTE} permissions means the permissions don't add
> > > > much value, e.g. they can't be used to distinguish between an
> > > > enclave that is being loaded from an unmodified file and an enclave
> > > > that is being
> generated on the fly, e.g. Graphene.
> > > >
> > > > Looking back at Andy's mail, he was talking about requiring
> > > > FILE__EXECUTE to run an enclave, so perhaps it's only FILE__WRITE
> > > > that we're trying to special case.
> > > >
> > >
> > > I thought about this some more, and I have a new proposal that helps
> > > address the ELRANGE alignment issue and the permission issue at the
> > > cost of some extra verbosity. Maybe you all can poke holes in it :)
> > > The basic idea is to make everything more explicit from a user's
> > > perspective. Here's how it works:
> > >
> > > Opening /dev/sgx/enclave gives an enclave_fd that, by design,
> > > doesn't give EXECUTE or WRITE. mmap() on the enclave_fd only works
> > > if you pass PROT_NONE and gives the correct alignment. The
> > > resulting VMA cannot be mprotected or mremapped. It can't be
> > > mmapped at all until
> >
> > I assume you're thinking of clearing all VM_MAY* flags in sgx_mmap()?
> >
> > > after ECREATE because the alignment isn't known before that.
> >
> > I don't follow. The alignment is known because userspace knows the
> > size of its enclave. The initial unknown is the address, but that
> > becomes known once the initial mmap() completes.
>
> [...]
>
> I think I made the mistake of getting too carried away with implementation
> details rather
> than just getting to the point. And I misremembered the ECREATE flow --
> oops. Let me try
> again. First, here are some problems with some earlier proposals (mine, yours
> Cedric's):
>
> - Having the EADD operation always work but have different effects depending
> on the
> source memory permissions is, at the very least, confusing.
Inheriting permissions from source pages IMHO is the easiest way to validate
the EPC permissions without any changes to LSM. And the argument about its
security is also easy to make.
I understand that it may take some effort to document it properly but otherwise
don't see any practical issues with it.
>
> - If we want to encourage user programs to be well-behaved, we want to make
> it easy to
> map the RX parts of an enclave RX, the RW parts RW, the RO parts R, etc. But
> this
> interacts poorly with the sgx_mmap() alignment magic, as you've pointed out.
>
> - We don't want to couple LSMs with SGX too tightly.
>
> So here's how a nice interface might work:
>
> int enclave_fd = open("/dev/sgx/enclave", O_RDWR);
>
> /* enclave_fd points to a totally blank enclave. Before ECREATE, we need to
> decide on an
> address. */
>
> void *addr = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_NONE, MAP_SHARED, enclave_fd, 0);
>
> /* we have an address! */
>
> ioctl(enclave_fd, ECREATE, ...);
>
> /* now add some data to the enclave. We want the RWX addition to fail
> immediately unless we have the relevant LSM pemission. Similarly, we
> want the RX addition to fail immediately unless the source VMA is
> appropriate. */
>
> ioctl(enclave_fd, EADD, rx_source_1, MAXPERM=RX, ...); [the ...
> includes SECINFO, which the kernel doesn't really care about]
> ioctl(enclave_fd, EADD,
> ro_source_1, MAXPERM=RX ...); ioctl(enclave_fd, EADD, rw_source_1, MAXPERM=RW
> ...);
> ioctl(enclave_fd, EADD, rwx_source_1, MAXPERM=RWX ...);
If MAXPERM is taken from ioctl parameters, the real question here is how to
validate MAXPERM. Guess we shouldn't allow arbitrary MAXPERM to be specified by
user code, and the only logical source I can think of is from the source pages
(or from the enclave source file, but memory mapping is preferred because it
offers more flexibility).
>
> ioctl(enclave_fd, EINIT, ...); /* presumably pass sigstruct_fd here, too. */
>
> /* at this point, all is well except that the enclave is mapped PROT_NONE.
> There are a
> couple ways I can imagine to fix this. */
>
> We could use mmap:
>
> mmap(baseaddr+offset, len, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, enclave_fd, 0);
> /* only
> succeeds if MAXPERM & R == R */
>
> But this has some annoying implications with regard to
> sgx_get_unmapped_area(). We could
> use an ioctl:
There's an easy fix. Just let sgx_get_unmapped_area() do the natural alignment
only if MAP_FIXED is *not* set, otherwise, honor both address and len.
But mmap() is subject to LSM check (probably against /dev/sgx/enclave?). How to
do mmap(RX) if FILE__EXECUTE is *not* granted for /dev/sgx/enclave, even if
MAXPERM=RX?
>
> ioctl(enclave_fd, SGX_IOC_MPROTECT, offset, len, PROT_READ);
>
> which has the potentially nice property that we can completely bypass the LSM
> hooks,
> because the LSM has *already* vetted everything when the EADD calls were
> allowed. Or we
> could maybe even just use
> mprotect() itself:
>
> mprotect(baseaddr + offset, len, PROT_READ);
How to bypass LSM hooks in this mprotect()?
>
> Or, for the really evil option, we could use a bit of magic in .fault and do
> nothing here.
> Instead we'd make the initial mapping PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC and have
> .fault
> actually instantiate the PTEs with the intersection of the VMA permissions
> and MAXPERM. I
> don't think I like this alternative, since it feels more magical than needed
> and it will
> be harder to debug. I like the fact that /proc/self/maps shows the actual
> permissions in
> all the other variants.
Agreed.
>
>
> All of the rest of the crud in my earlier email was just implementation
> details. The
> point I was trying to make was that I think it's possible to implement this
> without making
> too much of a mess internally. I think I favor the mprotect() approach since
> it makes the
> behavior fairly obvious.
>
> I don't think any of this needs to change for SGX2. We'd have an
> ioctl() that does EAUG and specifies MAXPERM. Trying to mprotect() a page
> that hasn't
> been added yet with any permission other than PROT_NONE would fail. I
> suppose we might
> end up needing a way to let the EAUG operation *change* MAXPERM, and this
> operation would
> have to do some more LSM checks and walk all the existing mappings to make
> sure they're
> consistent with the new MAXPERM.
EAUG ioctl could be a solution, but isn't optimal at least. What we've done is
#PF based. Specifically, an SGX2 enclave will have its heap mapped as RW, but
without any pages populated before EINIT. Then when the enclave needs a new
page in its heap, it issues EACCEPT, which will cause a #PF and the driver will
respond by EAUG a new EPC page. And then the enclave will be resumed and the
faulted EACCEPT will be retried (and succeed).
>
> As an aside, I wonder if Linus et all would be okay with a new
> MAP_FULLY_ALIGNED mmap()
> flag that allocated memory aligned to the requested size. Then we could get
> rid of yet
> another bit of magic.
>
> --Andy
I've also got a chance to think more about it lately.
When we talk about EPC page permissions with SGX2 in mind, I think we should
distinguish between initial permissions and runtime permissions. Initial
permissions refer to the page permissions set at EADD. They are technically set
by "untrusted" code so should go by policies similar to those applicable to
regular shared objects. Runtime permissions refer to the permissions granted by
EMODPE, EAUG and EACCEPTCOPY. They are resulted from inherent behavior of the
enclave, which in theory is determined by the enclave's measurements (MRENCLAVE
and/or MRSIGNER).
And we have 2 distinct files to work with - the enclave file and
/dev/sgx/enclave. And I consider the enclave file a logical source for initial
permissions while /dev/sgx/enclave is a means to control runtime permissions.
Then we can have a simpler approach like the pseudo code below.
/**
* Summary:
* - The enclave file resembles a shared object that contains RO/RX/RW segments
* - FILE__* are assigned to /dev/sgx/enclave, to determine acceptable
permissions to mmap()/mprotect(), valid combinations are
* + FILE__READ - Allow SGX1 enclaves only
* + FILE__READ|FILE__WRITE - Allow SGX2 enclaves to expand data segments
(e.g. heaps, stacks, etc.)
* + FILE__READ|FILE__WRITE|FILE__EXECUTE - Allow SGX2 enclaves to expend
both data and code segments. This is necessary to support dynamically linked
enclaves (e.g. Graphene)
* + FILE__READ|FILE__EXECUTE - Allow RW->RX changes for SGX1 enclaves -
necessary to support dynamically linked enclaves (e.g. Graphene) on SGX1.
EXECMEM is also required for this to work
* + <None> - Disallow the calling process to launch any enclaves
*/
/* Step 1: mmap() the enclave file according to the segment attributes (similar
to what dlopen() would do for regular shared objects) */
int image_fd = open("/path/to/enclave/file", O_RDONLY);
foreach phdr in loadable segments /* phdr->p_type == PT_LOAD */ {
/* <segment permission> below is subject to LSM checks */
loadable_segments[i] = mmap(NULL, phdr->p_memsz, MAP_PRIATE, <segment
permission>, image_fd, phdr->p_offset);
}
/* Step 2: Create enclave */
int enclave_fd = open("/dev/sgx/enclave", O_RDONLY /* or O_RDWR for SGX2
enclaves */);
void *enclave_base = mmap(NULL, <enclave size>, MAP_SHARED, PROT_READ,
enclave_fd, 0); /* Only FILE__READ is required here */
ioctl(enclave_fd, IOC_ECREATE, ...);
/* Step 3: EADD and map initial EPC pages */
foreach s in loadable_segments {
/* IOC_EADD_AND_MAP_SEGMENT will make sure s->perm is a subset of VMA
permissions of the source pages, and use that as *both* EPCM and VMA
permissions).
* Given enclave_fd may have FILE__READ only, LSM has to be bypassed so the
"mmap" part has to be done inside the driver.
* Initial EPC pages will be mapped only once, so no inode is needed to
remember the initial permissions. mmap/mprotect afterwards are subject to
FILE__* on /dev/sgx/enclave
* The key point here is: permissions of source pages govern initial
permissions of EADD'ed pages, regardless FILE__* on /dev/sgx/enclave
*/
ioctl(enclave_fd, IOC_EADD_AND_MAP_SEGMENT, s->base, s->size, s->perm...);
}
/* EADD other enclave components, e.g. TCS, stacks, heaps, etc. */
ioctl(enclave_fd, IOC_EADD_AND_MAP_SEGMENT, tcs, 0x1000, RW | PT_TCS...);
ioctl(enclave_fd, IOC_EADD_AND_MAP_SEGMENT, <zero page>, <stack size>, RW...);
...
/* Step 4 (SGX2 only): Reserve ranges for additional heaps, stacks, etc. */
/* FILE__WRITE required to allow expansion of data segments at runtime */
/* Key point here is: permissions, if needed to change at runtime, are subject
to FILL__* on /dev/sgx/enclave */
mprotect(<heap address>, <heap size>, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
/* Step 5: EINIT */
ioctl(IOC_EINIT, <sigstruct>...);
/* Step 6 (SGX2 only): Set RX for dynamically loaded code pages (e.g. Graphene,
encrypted enclaves, etc.) as needed, at runtime */
/* FILE__EXECUTE required */
mprotect(<RX address>, <RX size>, PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC);
-Cedric
