[Please do not top-post]
On Thu 30-05-19 13:20:01, Dianzhang Chen wrote:
> It is possible that a CPU mis-predicts the conditional branch, and
> speculatively loads size_index[size_index_elem(size)], even if size >192.
> Although this value will subsequently be discarded,
> but it can not drop all the effects of speculative execution,
> such as the presence or absence of data in caches. Such effects may
> form side-channels which can be
> observed to extract secret information.
I understand the general mechanism of spectre v1. What I was asking for
is an example of where userspace directly controls the allocation size
as this is usually bounded to an in kernel object size. I can see how
and N * sizeof(object) where N is controlled by the userspace could be
the target. But calling that out explicitly would be appreciated.
> As for "why this particular path a needs special treatment while other
> size branches are ok",
> i think the other size branches need to treatment as well at first place,
> but in code `index = fls(size - 1)` the function `fls` will make the
> index at specific range,
> so it can not use `kmalloc_caches[kmalloc_type(flags)][index]` to load
> arbitury data.
> But, still it may load some date that it shouldn't, if necessary, i
> think can add array_index_nospec as well.
Please mention that in the changelog as well.
> On Thu, May 30, 2019 at 1:49 AM Michal Hocko <mho...@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Thu 30-05-19 00:39:53, Dianzhang Chen wrote:
> > > It's come from `192+1`.
> > >
> > >
> > > The more code fragment is:
> > >
> > >
> > > if (size <= 192) {
> > >
> > > if (!size)
> > >
> > > return ZERO_SIZE_PTR;
> > >
> > > size = array_index_nospec(size, 193);
> > >
> > > index = size_index[size_index_elem(size)];
> > >
> > > }
> >
> > OK I see, I could have looked into the code, my bad. But I am still not
> > sure what is the potential exploit scenario and why this particular path
> > a needs special treatment while other size branches are ok. Could you be
> > more specific please?
> > --
> > Michal Hocko
> > SUSE Labs
--
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs
