On Mon, Jun 10, 2019 at 06:06:00PM +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 05, 2019 at 07:11:41PM -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> > SGX will use the may_mprotect() hook to prevent userspace from
> > circumventing various security checks, e.g. Linux Security Modules.
> > Naming it may_mprotect() instead of simply mprotect() is intended to
> > reflect the hook's purpose as a way to gate mprotect() as opposed to
> > a wholesale replacement.
>
> "This commit adds may_mprotect() to struct vm_operations_struct, which
> can be used to ask from the owner of a VMA if mprotect() is allowed."
>
> This would be more appropriate statement because that is what the code
> change aims for precisely. I did not even understand what you meant by
> gating in this context. I would leave SGX and LSM's (and especially
> "various security checks", which means abssolutely nothing) out of the
> first paragraph completely.
>
> > Enclaves are built by copying data from normal memory into the Enclave
> > Page Cache (EPC). Due to the nature of SGX, the EPC is represented by a
> > single file that must be MAP_SHARED, i.e. mprotect() only ever sees a
> > MAP_SHARED vm_file that references single file path. Furthermore, all
> > enclaves will need read, write and execute pages in the EPC.
>
> I would just say that "Due to the fact that EPC is delivered as IO
> memory from the preboot firmware, it can be only mapped as MAP_SHARED".
> It is what it is.
I was trying to convey that the nature of SGX itself requires that an
enclave's pages are shared between process. E.g. {MAP,VM}_SHARED would be
required even if we modified the mmu to handle EPC memory in such a way
that it didn't have to be tagged with VM_PFNMAP.
> > As a result, LSM policies cannot be meaningfully applied, e.g. an LSM
> > can deny access to the EPC as a whole, but can't deny PROT_EXEC on page
> > that originated in a non-EXECUTE file (which is long gone by the time
> > mprotect() is called).
>
> I have hard time following what is paragraph is trying to say.
>
> > By hooking mprotect(), SGX can make explicit LSM upcalls while an
> > enclave is being built, i.e. when the kernel has a handle to origin of
> > each enclave page, and enforce the result of the LSM policy whenever
> > userspace maps the enclave page in the future.
>
> "LSM policy whenever calls mprotect()"? I'm no sure why you mean by
> mapping here and if there is any need to talk about future. Isn't this
> needed now?
Future is referring to the timeline of a running kernel, not the future
of the kernel code.
Rather than trying to explain all of the above with words, I'll provide
code examples to show how ->may_protect() will be used by SGX and why it
is the preferred solution.
> > Alternatively, SGX could play games with MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC}, but
> > that approach is quite ugly, e.g. would require userspace to call an
> > SGX ioctl() prior to using mprotect() to extend a page's protections.
>
> Instead of talking "playing games" I would state what could be done with
> VM_MAY{READ,WRITE,EXEC} and why it is bad. Leaves questions otherwise.
>
> > Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopher...@intel.com>
> > ---
> > include/linux/mm.h | 2 ++
> > mm/mprotect.c | 15 +++++++++++----
> > 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
> > index 0e8834ac32b7..a697996040ac 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/mm.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
> > @@ -458,6 +458,8 @@ struct vm_operations_struct {
> > void (*close)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> > int (*split)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long addr);
> > int (*mremap)(struct vm_area_struct * area);
> > + int (*may_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct * area, unsigned long start,
> > + unsigned long end, unsigned long prot);
>
> Could be just boolean.
>
> /Jarkko
