From: Liran Alon <liran.a...@oracle.com>
Add the address_space_isolation parameter to the kvm module.
When set to true, KVM #VMExit handlers run in isolated address space
which maps only KVM required code and per-VM information instead of
entire kernel address space.
This mechanism is meant to mitigate memory-leak side-channels CPU
vulnerabilities (e.g. Spectre, L1TF and etc.) but can also be viewed
as security in-depth as it also helps generically against info-leaks
vulnerabilities in KVM #VMExit handlers and reduce the available
gadgets for ROP attacks.
This is set to false by default because it incurs a performance hit
which some users will not want to take for security gain.
Signed-off-by: Liran Alon <liran.a...@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.char...@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 3 ++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/isolation.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/isolation.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
index 31ecf7a..71579ed 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Makefile
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ kvm-y += x86.o mmu.o emulate.o i8259.o irq.o
lapic.o \
i8254.o ioapic.o irq_comm.o cpuid.o pmu.o mtrr.o \
hyperv.o page_track.o debugfs.o
-kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o
vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o
+kvm-intel-y += vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o
\
+ vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/isolation.o
kvm-amd-y += svm.o pmu_amd.o
obj-$(CONFIG_KVM) += kvm.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/isolation.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/isolation.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e25f663
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/isolation.c
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * KVM Address Space Isolation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+
+/*
+ * When set to true, KVM #VMExit handlers run in isolated address space
+ * which maps only KVM required code and per-VM information instead of
+ * entire kernel address space.
+ *
+ * This mechanism is meant to mitigate memory-leak side-channels CPU
+ * vulnerabilities (e.g. Spectre, L1TF and etc.) but can also be viewed
+ * as security in-depth as it also helps generically against info-leaks
+ * vulnerabilities in KVM #VMExit handlers and reduce the available
+ * gadgets for ROP attacks.
+ *
+ * This is set to false by default because it incurs a performance hit
+ * which some users will not want to take for security gain.
+ */
+static bool __read_mostly address_space_isolation;
+module_param(address_space_isolation, bool, 0444);
--
1.7.1
