On Thu, Jul 18, 2019 at 12:44:09PM -0700, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> From: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
> 
> bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
> private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
> has been locked down in confidentiality mode.
> 
> Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoi...@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mj...@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>

-Kees

> cc: net...@vger.kernel.org
> cc: Chun-Yi Lee <j...@suse.com>
> cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoi...@gmail.com>
> Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net>
> ---
>  include/linux/security.h     |  1 +
>  kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c     | 10 ++++++++++
>  security/lockdown/lockdown.c |  1 +
>  3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 987d8427f091..8dd1741a52cd 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
>       LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
>       LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
>       LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
> +     LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
>       LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
>  };
>  
> diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> index ca1255d14576..492a8bfaae98 100644
> --- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> +++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
> @@ -142,8 +142,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const 
> void *, unsafe_ptr)
>  {
>       int ret;
>  
> +     ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
> +     if (ret < 0)
> +             goto out;
> +
>       ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
>       if (unlikely(ret < 0))
> +out:
>               memset(dst, 0, size);
>  
>       return ret;
> @@ -569,6 +574,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
>  {
>       int ret;
>  
> +     ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
> +     if (ret < 0)
> +             goto out;
> +
>       /*
>        * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire
>        * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
> @@ -580,6 +589,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
>        */
>       ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
>       if (unlikely(ret < 0))
> +out:
>               memset(dst, 0, size);
>  
>       return ret;
> diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> index 6b123cbf3748..1b89d3e8e54d 100644
> --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char 
> *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
>       [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
>       [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
>       [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
> +     [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
>       [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
>  };
>  
> -- 
> 2.22.0.510.g264f2c817a-goog
> 

-- 
Kees Cook

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