[PATCH V40 23/29] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode

[Matthew Garrett]

From: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>

bpf_read() and bpf_read_str() could potentially be abused to (eg) allow
private keys in kernel memory to be leaked. Disable them if the kernel
has been locked down in confidentiality mode.

Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoi...@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mj...@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
cc: net...@vger.kernel.org
cc: Chun-Yi Lee <j...@suse.com>
cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoi...@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmor...@namei.org>
---
 include/linux/security.h     |  1 +
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c     | 10 ++++++++++
 security/lockdown/lockdown.c |  1 +
 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 0b2529dbf0f4..e604f4c67f03 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
        LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
        LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
        LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
+       LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
        LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX,
 };
 
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 1c9a4745e596..33a954c367f3 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -139,8 +139,13 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read, void *, dst, u32, size, const 
void *, unsafe_ptr)
 {
        int ret;
 
+       ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
        ret = probe_kernel_read(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
        if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+out:
                memset(dst, 0, size);
 
        return ret;
@@ -566,6 +571,10 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
 {
        int ret;
 
+       ret = security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ);
+       if (ret < 0)
+               goto out;
+
        /*
         * The strncpy_from_unsafe() call will likely not fill the entire
         * buffer, but that's okay in this circumstance as we're probing
@@ -577,6 +586,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_read_str, void *, dst, u32, size,
         */
        ret = strncpy_from_unsafe(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
        if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+out:
                memset(dst, 0, size);
 
        return ret;
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
index 27b2cf51e443..2397772c56bd 100644
--- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
+++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] 
= {
        [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
        [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
        [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
+       [LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
        [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
 };
 
-- 
2.23.0.rc1.153.gdeed80330f-goog