On Sun, Sep 15, 2019 at 08:51:42AM +0200, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Sa, 14.09.19 09:30, Linus Torvalds (torva...@linux-foundation.org) wrote:
[...]
> 
> And please don't break /dev/urandom again. The above code is the ony
> way I see how we can make /dev/urandom-derived swap encryption safe,
> and the only way I can see how we can sanely write a valid random seed
> to disk after boot.
>

Any hope in making systemd-random-seed(8) credit that "random seed
from previous boot" file, through RNDADDENTROPY, *by default*?

Because of course this makes the problem reliably go away on my system
too (as discussed in the original bug report, but you were not CCed).

I know that by v243, just released 12 days ago, this can be optionally
done through SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT=1. I wonder though if it can
ever be done by default, just like what the BSDs does... This would
solve a big part of the current problem.

> Lennart

thanks,

-- 
darwi
http://darwish.chasingpointers.com

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