On Tue, Oct 1, 2019 at 1:37 AM Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masah...@socionext.com> wrote: > > KernelCI reports that bcm2835_defconfig is no longer booting since > commit ac7c3e4ff401 ("compiler: enable CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING > forcibly") (https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/26/825). > > I also received a regression report from Nicolas Saenz Julienne > (https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/9/27/263). > > This problem has cropped up on bcm2835_defconfig because it enables > CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE. The compiler tends to prefer not inlining > functions with -Os. I was able to reproduce it with other boards and > defconfig files by manually enabling CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE. > > The __get_user_check() specifically uses r0, r1, r2 registers. > So, uaccess_save_and_enable() and uaccess_restore() must be inlined. > Otherwise, those register assignments would be entirely dropped, > according to my analysis of the disassembly. > > Prior to commit 9012d011660e ("compiler: allow all arches to enable > CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING"), the 'inline' marker was always enough for > inlining functions, except on x86. > > Since that commit, all architectures can enable CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING. > So, __always_inline is now the only guaranteed way of forcible inlining.
No, the C preprocessor is the only guaranteed way of inlining. I preferred v1; if you're going to <strikethrough>play with fire</strikethrough>write assembly, don't get burned. > > I also added __always_inline to 4 functions in the call-graph from the > __get_user_check() macro. > > Fixes: 9012d011660e ("compiler: allow all arches to enable > CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING") > Reported-by: "kernelci.org bot" <b...@kernelci.org> > Reported-by: Nicolas Saenz Julienne <nsaenzjulie...@suse.de> > Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masah...@socionext.com> > --- > > Changes in v2: > - Use __always_inline instead of changing the function call places > (per Russell King) > - The previous submission is: > https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/1132459/ > > arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h | 8 ++++---- > arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 4 ++-- > 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h > index 567dbede4785..f1d0a7807cd0 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h > +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/domain.h > @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ > #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ > > #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_CP15_MMU > -static inline unsigned int get_domain(void) > +static __always_inline unsigned int get_domain(void) > { > unsigned int domain; > > @@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_domain(void) > return domain; > } > > -static inline void set_domain(unsigned val) > +static __always_inline void set_domain(unsigned int val) > { > asm volatile( > "mcr p15, 0, %0, c3, c0 @ set domain" > @@ -102,12 +102,12 @@ static inline void set_domain(unsigned val) > isb(); > } > #else > -static inline unsigned int get_domain(void) > +static __always_inline unsigned int get_domain(void) > { > return 0; > } > > -static inline void set_domain(unsigned val) > +static __always_inline void set_domain(unsigned int val) > { > } > #endif > diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h > index 303248e5b990..98c6b91be4a8 100644 > --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h > +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h > @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ > * perform such accesses (eg, via list poison values) which could then > * be exploited for priviledge escalation. > */ > -static inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void) > +static __always_inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void) > { > #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN > unsigned int old_domain = get_domain(); > @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static inline unsigned int uaccess_save_and_enable(void) > #endif > } > > -static inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags) > +static __always_inline void uaccess_restore(unsigned int flags) > { > #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SW_DOMAIN_PAN > /* Restore the user access mask */ > -- > 2.17.1 > -- Thanks, ~Nick Desaulniers