Test propagation of noexec mount points or file executability through
files open with or without RESOLVE_MAYEXEC.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net>
Reviewed-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sauter...@ssi.gouv.fr>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyp...@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
Cc: Shuah Khan <sh...@kernel.org>
---
Changes since v2:
* Move tests from exec/ to openat2/ .
* Replace O_MAYEXEC with RESOLVE_MAYEXEC from openat2(2).
* Cleanup tests.
Changes since v1:
* Move tests from yama/ to exec/ .
* Fix _GNU_SOURCE in kselftest_harness.h .
* Add a new test sysctl_access_write to check if CAP_MAC_ADMIN is taken
into account.
* Test directory execution which is always forbidden since commit
73601ea5b7b1 ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files during
execve()"), and also check that even the root user can not bypass file
execution checks.
* Make sure delete_workspace() always as enough right to succeed.
* Cosmetic cleanup.
---
tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h | 3 +
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile | 3 +-
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/config | 1 +
tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h | 3 +
.../testing/selftests/openat2/omayexec_test.c | 315 ++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/config
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/openat2/omayexec_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h
b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h
index 2bb8c81fc0b4..f6e056ba4a13 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kselftest_harness.h
@@ -50,7 +50,10 @@
#ifndef __KSELFTEST_HARNESS_H
#define __KSELFTEST_HARNESS_H
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#endif
+
#include <asm/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
index 4b93b1417b86..cb98bdb4d5b1 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
CFLAGS += -Wall -O2 -g -fsanitize=address -fsanitize=undefined
-TEST_GEN_PROGS := openat2_test resolve_test rename_attack_test
+LDLIBS += -lcap
+TEST_GEN_PROGS := openat2_test resolve_test rename_attack_test omayexec_test
include ../lib.mk
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/config
b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/config
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dd53c266bf52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/config
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+CONFIG_SYSCTL=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
index a6ea27344db2..2a46d5446110 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/helpers.h
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include "../kselftest.h"
@@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ bool needs_openat2(const struct open_how *how);
#define RESOLVE_IN_ROOT 0x10 /* Make all jumps to "/" and ".."
be scoped inside the dirfd
(similar to chroot(2)). */
+#define RESOLVE_MAYEXEC 0x20 /* Command execution from file is
+ intended, checks exec permissions. */
#endif /* RESOLVE_IN_ROOT */
#define E_func(func, ...) \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/omayexec_test.c
b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/omayexec_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5298cbd5b7e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/openat2/omayexec_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test openat2(2) with RESOLVE_MAYEXEC
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ *
+ * Author: Mickaël Salaün <m...@digikod.net>
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/capability.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "helpers.h"
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+
+#define SYSCTL_MAYEXEC "/proc/sys/fs/open_mayexec_enforce"
+
+#define BIN_DIR "./test-mount"
+#define BIN_PATH BIN_DIR "/file"
+#define DIR_PATH BIN_DIR "/directory"
+
+#define ALLOWED 1
+#define DENIED 0
+
+static void ignore_dac(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int override)
+{
+ cap_t caps;
+ const cap_value_t cap_val[2] = {
+ CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
+ CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
+ };
+
+ caps = cap_get_proc();
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, caps);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 2, cap_val,
+ override ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, cap_set_proc(caps));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, cap_free(caps));
+}
+
+static void ignore_mac(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int override)
+{
+ cap_t caps;
+ const cap_value_t cap_val[1] = {
+ CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ };
+
+ caps = cap_get_proc();
+ ASSERT_NE(NULL, caps);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 1, cap_val,
+ override ? CAP_SET : CAP_CLEAR));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, cap_set_proc(caps));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, cap_free(caps));
+}
+
+static void test_omx(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ const char *const path, const int exec_allowed)
+{
+ struct open_how how = {
+ .flags = O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC,
+ };
+ int fd;
+
+ /* Opens without MAYEXEC. */
+ fd = sys_openat2(AT_FDCWD, path, &how);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+ /* Opens with MAYEXEC. */
+ how.resolve = RESOLVE_MAYEXEC;
+ fd = sys_openat2(AT_FDCWD, path, &how);
+ if (exec_allowed) {
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-EACCES, fd);
+ }
+}
+
+static void test_omx_dir_file(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ const char *const dir_path, const char *const file_path,
+ const int exec_allowed)
+{
+ /*
+ * Directory execution is always denied since commit 73601ea5b7b1
+ * ("fs/open.c: allow opening only regular files during execve()").
+ */
+ test_omx(_metadata, dir_path, DENIED);
+ test_omx(_metadata, file_path, exec_allowed);
+}
+
+static void test_dir_file(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ const char *const dir_path, const char *const file_path,
+ const int exec_allowed)
+{
+ /* Tests as root. */
+ ignore_dac(_metadata, 1);
+ test_omx_dir_file(_metadata, dir_path, file_path, exec_allowed);
+
+ /* Tests without bypass. */
+ ignore_dac(_metadata, 0);
+ test_omx_dir_file(_metadata, dir_path, file_path, exec_allowed);
+}
+
+static void sysctl_write(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ const char *path, const char *value)
+{
+ int fd;
+ size_t len_value;
+ ssize_t len_wrote;
+
+ fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ len_value = strlen(value);
+ len_wrote = write(fd, value, len_value);
+ ASSERT_EQ(len_wrote, len_value);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+}
+
+static void create_workspace(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+ int mount_exec, int file_exec)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ /*
+ * Cleans previous workspace if any error previously happened (don't
+ * check errors).
+ */
+ umount(BIN_DIR);
+ rmdir(BIN_DIR);
+
+ /* Creates a clean mount point. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(BIN_DIR, 00700));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mount("test", BIN_DIR, "tmpfs",
+ MS_MGC_VAL | (mount_exec ? 0 : MS_NOEXEC),
+ "mode=0700,size=4k"));
+
+ /* Creates a test file. */
+ fd = open(BIN_PATH, O_CREAT | O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC,
+ file_exec ? 00500 : 00400);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+ /* Creates a test directory. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mkdir(DIR_PATH, file_exec ? 00500 : 00400));
+}
+
+static void delete_workspace(struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
+{
+ ignore_mac(_metadata, 1);
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "0");
+
+ /* There is no need to unlink BIN_PATH nor DIR_PATH. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, umount(BIN_DIR));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, rmdir(BIN_DIR));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_DATA(mount_exec_file_exec) { };
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(mount_exec_file_exec)
+{
+ create_workspace(_metadata, 1, 1);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(mount_exec_file_exec)
+{
+ delete_workspace(_metadata);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_exec_file_exec, mount)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "1");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, ALLOWED);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_exec_file_exec, file)
+{
+ /* Enforces file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "2");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, ALLOWED);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_exec_file_exec, mount_file)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount and file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "3");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, ALLOWED);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_DATA(mount_exec_file_noexec) { };
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(mount_exec_file_noexec)
+{
+ create_workspace(_metadata, 1, 0);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(mount_exec_file_noexec)
+{
+ delete_workspace(_metadata);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_exec_file_noexec, mount)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "1");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, ALLOWED);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_exec_file_noexec, file)
+{
+ /* Enforces file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "2");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, DENIED);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_exec_file_noexec, mount_file)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount and file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "3");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, DENIED);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_DATA(mount_noexec_file_exec) { };
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(mount_noexec_file_exec)
+{
+ create_workspace(_metadata, 0, 1);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(mount_noexec_file_exec)
+{
+ delete_workspace(_metadata);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_noexec_file_exec, mount)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "1");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, DENIED);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_noexec_file_exec, file)
+{
+ /* Enforces file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "2");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, ALLOWED);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_noexec_file_exec, mount_file)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount and file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "3");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, DENIED);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_DATA(mount_noexec_file_noexec) { };
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(mount_noexec_file_noexec)
+{
+ create_workspace(_metadata, 0, 0);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(mount_noexec_file_noexec)
+{
+ delete_workspace(_metadata);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_noexec_file_noexec, mount)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "1");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, DENIED);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_noexec_file_noexec, file)
+{
+ /* Enforces file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "2");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, DENIED);
+}
+
+TEST_F(mount_noexec_file_noexec, mount_file)
+{
+ /* Enforces mount and file exec check. */
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "3");
+ test_dir_file(_metadata, DIR_PATH, BIN_PATH, DENIED);
+}
+
+TEST(sysctl_access_write)
+{
+ int fd;
+ ssize_t len_wrote;
+
+ ignore_mac(_metadata, 1);
+ sysctl_write(_metadata, SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, "0");
+
+ ignore_mac(_metadata, 0);
+ fd = open(SYSCTL_MAYEXEC, O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, fd);
+ len_wrote = write(fd, "0", 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(len_wrote, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, close(fd));
+
+ ignore_mac(_metadata, 1);
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.26.2
