On 2020-05-05 21:15:11 +0000, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com>
> 
> The command is used to finailize the encryption context created with
> KVM_SEV_SEND_START command.
> 
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <t...@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mi...@redhat.com>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <h...@zytor.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonz...@redhat.com>
> Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrc...@redhat.com>
> Cc: Joerg Roedel <j...@8bytes.org>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <b...@suse.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>
> Cc: x...@kernel.org
> Cc: k...@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherf...@google.com>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.si...@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.ka...@amd.com>

Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busire...@oracle.com>

> ---
>  .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst        |  8 +++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 23 +++++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 31 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst 
> b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> index d0dfa5b54e4f..93884ec8918e 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
> @@ -314,6 +314,14 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
>                  __u32 trans_len;
>          };
>  
> +12. KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH
> +------------------------
> +
> +After completion of the migration flow, the KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command can 
> be
> +issued by the hypervisor to delete the encryption context.
> +
> +Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
> +
>  References
>  ==========
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> index 7031b660f64d..4d3031c9fdcf 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
> @@ -1153,6 +1153,26 @@ static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, 
> struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
>       return ret;
>  }
>  
> +static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> +     struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
> +     struct sev_data_send_finish *data;
> +     int ret;
> +
> +     if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> +             return -ENOTTY;
> +
> +     data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> +     if (!data)
> +             return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +     data->handle = sev->handle;
> +     ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, data, &argp->error);
> +
> +     kfree(data);
> +     return ret;
> +}
> +
>  int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>  {
>       struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
> @@ -1203,6 +1223,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
>       case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
>               r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
>               break;
> +     case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
> +             r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
> +             break;
>       default:
>               r = -EINVAL;
>               goto out;
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

Reply via email to