On Tue, 2020-05-19 at 13:59 +0300, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> On Tue, 2020-05-19 at 05:50 -0400, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> > KVM stores the gfn in MMIO SPTEs as a caching optimization. These are split
> > in two parts, as in "[high 11111 low]", to thwart any attempt to use these
> > bits
> > in an L1TF attack. This works as long as there are 5 free bits between
> > MAXPHYADDR and bit 50 (inclusive), leaving bit 51 free so that the MMIO
> > access triggers a reserved-bit-set page fault.
>
> Most of machines I used have MAXPHYADDR=39, however on larger server machines,
> isn't MAXPHYADDR already something like 48, thus not allowing enought space
> for these bits?
> This is the case for my machine as well.
>
> In this case, if I understand correctly, the MAXPHYADDR value reported to the
> guest can
> be reduced to accomodate for these bits, is that true?
>
>
> > The bit positions however were computed wrongly for AMD processors that have
> > encryption support. In this case, x86_phys_bits is reduced (for example
> > from 48 to 43, to account for the C bit at position 47 and four bits used
> > internally to store the SEV ASID and other stuff) while x86_cache_bits in
> > would remain set to 48, and _all_ bits between the reduced MAXPHYADDR
> > and bit 51 are set.
>
> If I understand correctly this is done by the host kernel. I haven't had
> memory encryption
> enabled when I did these tests.
>
>
> FYI, later on, I did some digging about SME and SEV on my machine (3970X),
> and found out that memory encryption (SME) does actually work,
> except that it makes AMD's own amdgpu driver panic on boot and according to
> google this is a very well known issue.
> This is why I always thought that it wasn't supported.
>
> I tested this issue while SME is enabled with efifb and it seems that its
> state (enabled/disabled) doesn't affect this bug,
> which suggest me that a buggy bios always reports that memory encrypiton is
> enabled in that msr, or something
> like that. I haven't yet studied this area well enought to be sure.
>
> SEV on the other hand is not active because the system doesn't seem to have
> PSP firmware loaded,
> and only have CCP active (I added some printks to the ccp/psp driver and it
> shows that PSP reports 0 capability which indicates that it is not there)
> It is reported as supported in CPUID (even SEV-ES).
>
> I tested this patch and it works.
>
> However note (not related to this patch) that running nested guest,
> makes the L1 guest panic right in the very startup of the guest when npt=1.
npt=0 of course - I need more coffee today.
Best regards,
Maxim Levitsky
> I tested this with many guest/host combinations and even with fedora kernel
> 5.3 running
> on both host and guest, this is the case.
>
> Tested-by: Maxim Levitsky <[email protected]>
>
> Overall the patch makes sense to me, however I don't yet know this area well
> enought
> for a review, but I think I'll dig into it today and once it all makes sense
> to me,
> I'll review this patch as well.
>
> Best regards,
> Maxim Levitsky
>
> > Then low_phys_bits would also cover some of the
> > bits that are set in the shadow_mmio_value, terribly confusing the gfn
> > caching mechanism.
> >
> > To fix this, avoid splitting gfns as long as the processor does not have
> > the L1TF bug (which includes all AMD processors). When there is no
> > splitting, low_phys_bits can be set to the reduced MAXPHYADDR removing
> > the overlap. This fixes "npt=0" operation on EPYC processors.
> >
> > Thanks to Maxim Levitsky for bisecting this bug.
> >
> > Cc: [email protected]
> > Fixes: 52918ed5fcf0 ("KVM: SVM: Override default MMIO mask if memory
> > encryption is enabled")
> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 19 ++++++++++---------
> > 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > index 8071952e9cf2..86619631ff6a 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
> > @@ -335,6 +335,8 @@ void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_mask, u64
> > mmio_value, u64 access_mask)
> > {
> > BUG_ON((u64)(unsigned)access_mask != access_mask);
> > BUG_ON((mmio_mask & mmio_value) != mmio_value);
> > + WARN_ON(mmio_value & (shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask <<
> > shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len));
> > + WARN_ON(mmio_value & shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask);
> > shadow_mmio_value = mmio_value | SPTE_MMIO_MASK;
> > shadow_mmio_mask = mmio_mask | SPTE_SPECIAL_MASK;
> > shadow_mmio_access_mask = access_mask;
> > @@ -583,16 +585,15 @@ static void kvm_mmu_reset_all_pte_masks(void)
> > * the most significant bits of legal physical address space.
> > */
> > shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask = 0;
> > - low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits;
> > - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits <
> > - 52 - shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len) {
> > + low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits;
> > + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) &&
> > + !WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits >=
> > + 52 - shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len)) {
> > + low_phys_bits = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits
> > + - shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len;
> > shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask =
> > - rsvd_bits(boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits -
> > - shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len,
> > - boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits - 1);
> > - low_phys_bits -= shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_mask_len;
> > - } else
> > - WARN_ON_ONCE(boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF));
> > + rsvd_bits(low_phys_bits, boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_bits -
> > 1);
> > + }
> >
> > shadow_nonpresent_or_rsvd_lower_gfn_mask =
> > GENMASK_ULL(low_phys_bits - 1, PAGE_SHIFT);
