On Fri, 19 Oct 2007, Andreas Gruenbacher wrote: > > Non-trivial modules (i.e., practically everything beyond capabilities) become > effective only after loading policy, anyway. If you can load policy, you can > as well first load a security module without making the system insecure.
I'd like to note that I asked people who were actually affected, and had examples of their real-world use to step forward and explain their use, and that I explicitly mentioned that this is something we can easily re-visit. But I also note that you did no such thing, neither has anybody else. The fact is, security people *are* insane. You just argue all the time, instead fo doing anything productive. So please don't include me in the Cc on your insane arguments - instead do something productive and I'm interested. Ok? That was the whole point of LSM in the first place. I'm *not* interested in getting roped into your insane arguments. I'm interested in moving forward and having real examples of real use and code. Until then, this issue is closed. I thought I had made that clear already, but apparently not clear enough. So I repeat: we can undo that commit, but I will damn well not care one whit about yet another pointless security model flamewar. Linus - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/