From: Marc Zyngier <m...@kernel.org>
commit a9ed4a6560b8562b7e2e2bed9527e88001f7b682 upstream.
When adding a new fd to an epoll, and that this new fd is an
epoll fd itself, we recursively scan the fds attached to it
to detect cycles, and add non-epool files to a "check list"
that gets subsequently parsed.
However, this check list isn't completely safe when deletions
can happen concurrently. To sidestep the issue, make sure that
a struct file placed on the check list sees its f_count increased,
ensuring that a concurrent deletion won't result in the file
disapearing from under our feet.
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <m...@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <v...@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <m...@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gre...@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/eventpoll.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/eventpoll.c
+++ b/fs/eventpoll.c
@@ -1890,9 +1890,11 @@ static int ep_loop_check_proc(void *priv
* not already there, and calling reverse_path_check()
* during ep_insert().
*/
- if (list_empty(&epi->ffd.file->f_tfile_llink))
+ if (list_empty(&epi->ffd.file->f_tfile_llink)) {
+ get_file(epi->ffd.file);
list_add(&epi->ffd.file->f_tfile_llink,
&tfile_check_list);
+ }
}
}
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
@@ -1936,6 +1938,7 @@ static void clear_tfile_check_list(void)
file = list_first_entry(&tfile_check_list, struct file,
f_tfile_llink);
list_del_init(&file->f_tfile_llink);
+ fput(file);
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tfile_check_list);
}
@@ -2095,9 +2098,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(epoll_ctl, int, epfd, in
clear_tfile_check_list();
goto error_tgt_fput;
}
- } else
+ } else {
+ get_file(tf.file);
list_add(&tf.file->f_tfile_llink,
&tfile_check_list);
+ }
mutex_lock_nested(&ep->mtx, 0);
if (is_file_epoll(tf.file)) {
tep = tf.file->private_data;
