> On Sep 7, 2020, at 3:15 AM, Christian Brauner <christian.brau...@ubuntu.com>
> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Sep 04, 2020 at 04:31:44PM -0400, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi wrote:
>> Syscall User Dispatch (SUD) must take precedence over seccomp, since the
>> use case is emulation (it can be invoked with a different ABI) such that
>> seccomp filtering by syscall number doesn't make sense in the first
>> place. In addition, either the syscall is dispatched back to userspace,
>> in which case there is no resource for seccomp to protect, or the
>
> Tbh, I'm torn here. I'm not a super clever attacker but it feels to me
> that this is still at least a clever way to circumvent a seccomp
> sandbox.
> If I'd be confined by a seccomp profile that would cause me to be
> SIGKILLed when I try do open() I could prctl() myself to do user
> dispatch to prevent that from happening, no?
>
Not really, I think. The idea is that you didn’t actually do open(). You did a
SYSCALL instruction which meant something else, and the syscall dispatch
correctly prevented the kernel from misinterpreting it as open().
