From: Mickaël Salaün <m...@linux.microsoft.com>
Commit 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing
/proc/pid/stat") replaced the use of ns_capable() with
has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Commit 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in
ptrace_has_cap()") replaced has_ns_capability{,_noaudit}() with
security_capable(), which doesn't set PF_SUPERPRIV neither.
Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of ns_capable()"), a
new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available. Let's use it!
As a result, the signature of ptrace_has_cap() is restored to its original one.
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brau...@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Eric Paris <epa...@redhat.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <ja...@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <o...@redhat.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <se...@hallyn.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhi...@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6b3ad6649a4c ("ptrace: reintroduce usage of subjective credentials in
ptrace_has_cap()")
Fixes: 69f594a38967 ("ptrace: do not audit capability check when outputing
/proc/pid/stat")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <m...@linux.microsoft.com>
---
kernel/ptrace.c | 18 ++++++------------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 43d6179508d6..aa3c2fd6e41b 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -264,23 +264,17 @@ static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child,
bool ignore_state)
return ret;
}
-static bool ptrace_has_cap(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
- unsigned int mode)
+static bool ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
{
- int ret;
-
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
- ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT);
- else
- ret = security_capable(cred, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, CAP_OPT_NONE);
-
- return ret == 0;
+ return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+ return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
}
/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
- const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
+ const struct cred *const cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
struct mm_struct *mm;
kuid_t caller_uid;
kgid_t caller_gid;
@@ -326,7 +320,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int mode)
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
goto ok;
- if (ptrace_has_cap(cred, tcred->user_ns, mode))
+ if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
goto ok;
rcu_read_unlock();
return -EPERM;
@@ -345,7 +339,7 @@ static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task,
unsigned int mode)
mm = task->mm;
if (mm &&
((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
- !ptrace_has_cap(cred, mm->user_ns, mode)))
+ !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
return -EPERM;
return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
--
2.28.0
