Hi Linus,
please pull a couple of SEV-ES hardening fixes against a malicious
hypervisor.
Thx.
---
The following changes since commit 3650b228f83adda7e5ee532e2b90429c03f7b9ec:
Linux 5.10-rc1 (2020-10-25 15:14:11 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git
tags/x86_seves_for_v5.10_rc3
for you to fetch changes up to 2411cd82112397bfb9d8f0f19cd46c3d71e0ce67:
x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory (2020-10-29 19:27:42
+0100)
----------------------------------------------------------------
A couple of changes to the SEV-ES code to perform more stringent
hypervisor checks before enabling encryption. (Joerg Roedel)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Joerg Roedel (5):
x86/boot/compressed/64: Introduce sev_status
x86/boot/compressed/64: Sanity-check CPUID results in the early #VC
handler
x86/boot/compressed/64: Check SEV encryption in 64-bit boot-path
x86/head/64: Check SEV encryption before switching to kernel page-table
x86/sev-es: Do not support MMIO to/from encrypted memory
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 1 +
arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 20 +++++++-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 16 ++++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es-shared.c | 26 ++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/sev-es.c | 20 +++++---
arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 1 +
8 files changed, 167 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG
Nürnberg
