The paranoid_entry and paranoid_exit assembly functions have been
replaced by the kernel_paranoid_entry() and kernel_paranoid_exit()
C functions. Now paranoid_entry/exit are not used anymore and can
be removed.

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.char...@oracle.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 131 --------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 131 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 9ea8187d4405..797effbe65b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -882,137 +882,6 @@ SYM_CODE_START(xen_failsafe_callback)
 SYM_CODE_END(xen_failsafe_callback)
 #endif /* CONFIG_XEN_PV */
 
-/*
- * Save all registers in pt_regs. Return GSBASE related information
- * in EBX depending on the availability of the FSGSBASE instructions:
- *
- * FSGSBASE    R/EBX
- *     N        0 -> SWAPGS on exit
- *              1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
- *
- *     Y        GSBASE value at entry, must be restored in paranoid_exit
- */
-SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_entry)
-       UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
-       cld
-       PUSH_AND_CLEAR_REGS save_ret=1
-       ENCODE_FRAME_POINTER 8
-
-       /*
-        * Always stash CR3 in %r14.  This value will be restored,
-        * verbatim, at exit.  Needed if paranoid_entry interrupted
-        * another entry that already switched to the user CR3 value
-        * but has not yet returned to userspace.
-        *
-        * This is also why CS (stashed in the "iret frame" by the
-        * hardware at entry) can not be used: this may be a return
-        * to kernel code, but with a user CR3 value.
-        *
-        * Switching CR3 does not depend on kernel GSBASE so it can
-        * be done before switching to the kernel GSBASE. This is
-        * required for FSGSBASE because the kernel GSBASE has to
-        * be retrieved from a kernel internal table.
-        */
-       SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
-
-       /*
-        * Handling GSBASE depends on the availability of FSGSBASE.
-        *
-        * Without FSGSBASE the kernel enforces that negative GSBASE
-        * values indicate kernel GSBASE. With FSGSBASE no assumptions
-        * can be made about the GSBASE value when entering from user
-        * space.
-        */
-       ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_entry_checkgs", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
-
-       /*
-        * Read the current GSBASE and store it in %rbx unconditionally,
-        * retrieve and set the current CPUs kernel GSBASE. The stored value
-        * has to be restored in paranoid_exit unconditionally.
-        *
-        * The unconditional write to GS base below ensures that no subsequent
-        * loads based on a mispredicted GS base can happen, therefore no LFENCE
-        * is needed here.
-        */
-       SAVE_AND_SET_GSBASE scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%rbx
-       ret
-
-.Lparanoid_entry_checkgs:
-       /* EBX = 1 -> kernel GSBASE active, no restore required */
-       movl    $1, %ebx
-       /*
-        * The kernel-enforced convention is a negative GSBASE indicates
-        * a kernel value. No SWAPGS needed on entry and exit.
-        */
-       movl    $MSR_GS_BASE, %ecx
-       rdmsr
-       testl   %edx, %edx
-       jns     .Lparanoid_entry_swapgs
-       ret
-
-.Lparanoid_entry_swapgs:
-       SWAPGS
-
-       /*
-        * The above SAVE_AND_SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 macro doesn't do an
-        * unconditional CR3 write, even in the PTI case.  So do an lfence
-        * to prevent GS speculation, regardless of whether PTI is enabled.
-        */
-       FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL_ENTRY
-
-       /* EBX = 0 -> SWAPGS required on exit */
-       xorl    %ebx, %ebx
-       ret
-SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_entry)
-
-/*
- * "Paranoid" exit path from exception stack.  This is invoked
- * only on return from non-NMI IST interrupts that came
- * from kernel space.
- *
- * We may be returning to very strange contexts (e.g. very early
- * in syscall entry), so checking for preemption here would
- * be complicated.  Fortunately, there's no good reason to try
- * to handle preemption here.
- *
- * R/EBX contains the GSBASE related information depending on the
- * availability of the FSGSBASE instructions:
- *
- * FSGSBASE    R/EBX
- *     N        0 -> SWAPGS on exit
- *              1 -> no SWAPGS on exit
- *
- *     Y        User space GSBASE, must be restored unconditionally
- */
-SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL(paranoid_exit)
-       UNWIND_HINT_REGS
-       /*
-        * The order of operations is important. RESTORE_CR3 requires
-        * kernel GSBASE.
-        *
-        * NB to anyone to try to optimize this code: this code does
-        * not execute at all for exceptions from user mode. Those
-        * exceptions go through error_exit instead.
-        */
-       RESTORE_CR3     scratch_reg=%rax save_reg=%r14
-
-       /* Handle the three GSBASE cases */
-       ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lparanoid_exit_checkgs", "", X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE
-
-       /* With FSGSBASE enabled, unconditionally restore GSBASE */
-       wrgsbase        %rbx
-       jmp             restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
-
-.Lparanoid_exit_checkgs:
-       /* On non-FSGSBASE systems, conditionally do SWAPGS */
-       testl           %ebx, %ebx
-       jnz             restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
-
-       /* We are returning to a context with user GSBASE */
-       SWAPGS_UNSAFE_STACK
-       jmp             restore_regs_and_return_to_kernel
-SYM_CODE_END(paranoid_exit)
-
 /*
  * Save all registers in pt_regs, and switch GS if needed.
  */
-- 
2.18.4

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