On 2020-12-09 11:42:05, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> IMA functions such as ima_match_keyring(), process_buffer_measurement(),
> ima_match_policy() etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently,
> these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data.
> This makes it harder to extend them without code duplication.
> 
> Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and
> reusable in other measurement scenarios.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi <tusha...@linux.microsoft.com>

I've got a few code cleanup suggestions to ima_match_rule_data() below
but the current patch is fine:

Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhi...@linux.microsoft.com>

> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h        |  6 ++--
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    |  6 ++--
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   |  6 ++--
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
>  4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 8e8b1e3cb847..e5622ce8cbb1 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
>  int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
>                  int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
>                  struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
> -                const char *keyring);
> +                const char *func_data);
>  int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
>  int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>                           struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
> @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache 
> *iint, struct file *file,
>                          struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);
>  void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int 
> size,
>                               const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
> -                             int pcr, const char *keyring);
> +                             int pcr, const char *func_data);
>  void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
>                          const unsigned char *filename);
>  int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
> @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char 
> **pathbuf, char *filename);
>  int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
>                    enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
>                    struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
> -                  const char *keyring);
> +                  const char *func_data);
>  void ima_init_policy(void);
>  void ima_update_policy(void);
>  void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 4f39fb93f278..af218babd198 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned 
> char *filename,
>   * @func: caller identifier
>   * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
>   * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template=
> - * @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action
> + * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL.
>   *
>   * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
>   *           subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
> @@ -186,14 +186,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const 
> unsigned char *filename,
>  int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
>                  int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
>                  struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
> -                const char *keyring)
> +                const char *func_data)
>  {
>       int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH;
>  
>       flags &= ima_policy_flag;
>  
>       return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr,
> -                             template_desc, keyring);
> +                             template_desc, func_data);
>  }
>  
>  /*
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 68956e884403..e76ef4bfd0f4 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -786,13 +786,13 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
>   * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
>   * @func: IMA hook
>   * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
> - * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed
> + * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL.
>   *
>   * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log.
>   */
>  void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int 
> size,
>                               const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
> -                             int pcr, const char *keyring)
> +                             int pcr, const char *func_data)
>  {
>       int ret = 0;
>       const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
> @@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, 
> const void *buf, int size,
>       if (func) {
>               security_task_getsecid(current, &secid);
>               action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func,
> -                                     &pcr, &template, keyring);
> +                                     &pcr, &template, func_data);
>               if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE))
>                       return;
>       }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> index 823a0c1379cb..25419c7ff50b 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
> @@ -453,30 +453,44 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, 
> unsigned long event,
>  }
>  
>  /**
> - * ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule
> - * @rule: a pointer to a rule
> - * @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule
> + * ima_match_rule_data - determine whether the given func_data matches
> + *                    the measure rule data
> + * @rule: IMA policy rule
> + * @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data
>   * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
>   *
> - * Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
> + * Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise.
>   */
> -static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> -                           const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred)
> +static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
> +                             const char *func_data,
> +                             const struct cred *cred)
>  {
> +     const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list = NULL;
>       bool matched = false;
>       size_t i;
>  
>       if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid))
>               return false;
>  
> -     if (!rule->keyrings)
> -             return true;
> +     switch (rule->func) {
> +     case KEY_CHECK:
> +             if (!rule->keyrings)
> +                     return true;
> +             else
> +                     opt_list = rule->keyrings;

You return if rule->keyrings is NULL so drop this else and simply make
the opt_list assignment.

> +             break;
> +     default:
> +             break;

I would like to see the 'return false;' happen immediately here instead
of waiting for the opt_list check below.

> +     }
>  
> -     if (!keyring)
> +     if (!func_data)
> +             return false;
> +
> +     if (!opt_list)
>               return false;

If you return false in the 'default:' case above, you can just remove this
entire conditional because you'll be assigning opt_list in all of the
valid cases of the switch statement.

Tyler

>  
> -     for (i = 0; i < rule->keyrings->count; i++) {
> -             if (!strcmp(rule->keyrings->items[i], keyring)) {
> +     for (i = 0; i < opt_list->count; i++) {
> +             if (!strcmp(opt_list->items[i], func_data)) {
>                       matched = true;
>                       break;
>               }
> @@ -493,20 +507,20 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry 
> *rule,
>   * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
>   * @func: LIM hook identifier
>   * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
> - * @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
> + * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL.
>   *
>   * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
>   */
>  static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
>                           const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
>                           enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
> -                         const char *keyring)
> +                         const char *func_data)
>  {
>       int i;
>  
>       if (func == KEY_CHECK) {
>               return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) &&
> -                    ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred);
> +                     ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred);
>       }
>       if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
>           (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
> @@ -610,8 +624,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, 
> enum ima_hooks func)
>   * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
>   * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
>   * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule
> - * @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy.
> - *           keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK.
> + * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL.
>   *
>   * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
>   * conditions.
> @@ -623,7 +636,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, 
> enum ima_hooks func)
>  int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,
>                    enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
>                    struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
> -                  const char *keyring)
> +                  const char *func_data)
>  {
>       struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
>       int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
> @@ -638,7 +651,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct 
> cred *cred, u32 secid,
>                       continue;
>  
>               if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
> -                                  keyring))
> +                                  func_data))
>                       continue;
>  
>               action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
> -- 
> 2.17.1
> 

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